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THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPERT JUROR
Paul F. Kirgis"
I. INTRODUCT'ION
A fundamental principle of the Anglo-American adjudicative system is that
cases must be decided based solely on evidence formally admitted through trial
procedures.1 A jury may not base its decision on information received outside of
those formal procedures.2 Thus, where the members of a jury learn facts about
the case through avenues such as media reports3 or unauthorized visits to the
scene of the events in question,
4 the verdict is tainted and may be overturned.
5
That principle does not imply, however, that every juror's mind must be a
tabula rasa upon entering the jury box. Jurors, like all human beings, possess a
set of beliefs about their experiences in the world based on their remembered
sensory perceptions. They rely on this body of background knowledge to make
sense of the evidentiary data put before them.6 A juror who did not have a
sufficient body of such background knowledge would be useless, or at least
would place intolerable evidentiary burdens on the parties and the judicial
system.7 For this reason, we expect jurors to possess and rely on a large body of
* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., Colgate University; J.D.,
Washington & Lee University. I am grateful to Emily Murphy for her invaluable research assistance.
1. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966) (stating that jury must reach its verdict
based solely "on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources"); Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454,462 (1907) (discussing theory of U.S. legal system "that the conclusions to be reached in
a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print").
2. See Edward J. Finley II, Ignorance as Bliss? The Historical Development of an American Rule
on Juror Knowledge, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 457, 458 (1990) (noting that only people with no personal
knowledge about case may serve as juror, and if jury relies on personal knowledge in rendering
judgment, decision can be vacated and remanded for new trial).
3. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 153 (1892) (overturning verdict where jurors read
newspaper account of incident in question).
4. See Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 655, 660 (Ala. 1984) (overturning verdict where
jurors made unauthorized visit to scene of events in question).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (permitting impeachment of jury verdict by evidence that
"extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention").
6. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 210, at 102 (1995)
(stating "[t]he minds of jurors and judges in the courtroom are not vacant, and we would not want
them to be").
7. See John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395, 395 (1985) (discussing "intolerable
burden on the adjudicatory process" that would be posed by requiring jurors to be "completely
ignorant of the world and its ways except so far as they are instructed by evidence formally
introduced").
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
general knowledge about the world, and we allow the parties, in determining
what evidence to present, to assume that the jurors have such a body of
knowledge.
8
The jurors' background knowledge, for the most part, is not part of the
evidence in the case. No formal rules govern its use.9 Instead, in terminology
coined by Professor John Mansfield in a widely cited article,10 jurors are entitled
to take "notice" of their background knowledge in much the same way that a
judge takes judicial notice of facts not reasonably subject to dispute."t Professor
Mansfield argued for limits on the permissible scope of "jury notice," with at
least some types of background knowledge treated as evidence and injected into
the decision-making process through formal trial procedures. 12 He proposed a
standard under which jurors would be entitled to rely on background knowledge
whenever "a substantial number of people in the community have the
information or hold the belief in question.
'13
Professor Mansfield's proposed standard has been criticized as unsound in
theory and unworkable in practice. 14 And although courts have occasionally
cited it, 15 no court has adopted its formula. In general, courts have declined to
intercede where litigants attack a verdict on the ground that a juror brought
prejudicial background knowledge to bear on the decision-making process.
1 6
8. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 279-80 (1898) (noting that "[iln conducting a process of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning,
not a step can be taken without assuming something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do
this with competent judgment and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries as part of their necessary
mental outfit").
9. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note (concluding that jury's use of "non-
evidence facts in evaluating the adjudicative facts of the case is not an appropriate subject for a
formalized judicial notice treatment").
10. See generally Mansfield, supra note 7, at 396 (discussing standard to be used for "jury notice"
when jurors use background information not introduced into evidence).
11. See FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory committee's note (referring to this kind of information
simply as "non-evidence facts").
12. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 395-97, 420-22.
13. Id. at 407. Professor Mansfield's "substantial number" standard is intended to provide a
wider field for jury notice than other possible standards, such as "virtually all," "substantial majority,"
or "majority." Id. at 400.
14. See Richard M. Fraher, Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidence Facts, and Permissible Jury
Background Information, 62 IND. L.J. 333, 337-38 (1987) (arguing proposed standards do not resolve
theoretical questions).
15. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d 846, 852 (N.Y. 2001) (citing John H. Mansfield, Jury
Notice, 74 GEO L.J. 395 (1985)).
16. See, e.g., Hard v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming denial
of new trial where juror asserted special knowledge regarding x-ray interpretation and noting that "[ilt
is expected that jurors will bring their life experiences to bear on the facts of a case."); State v. Aguilar,
818 P.2d 165, 167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing how it is expected for jurors to bring individual
knowledge and experience into court room which aids in case resolution); Wagner v. Doulton, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 552-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding no misconduct where juror who was engineer drew map
for other jurors); State v. DeMers, 762 P.2d 860, 863 (Mont. 1988) (finding that juror's knowledge
about study of bones used by jury to question credibility of expert witness did not constitute
"extraneous prejudicial information"); State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 135 (N.M. 2002) (holding that
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Most courts apparently have not seen a compelling reason to establish specific
standards to govern a process that is intentionally shrouded in mystery.
7
Events of the last decade, however, give new reason for concern about the
permissible scope of jury background knowledge, and specifically about the
potential prejudice resulting from juror expertise. Beginning with Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,i8 the Supreme Court undertook a thorough
overhaul of the rules of evidence governing testimony by expert witnesses.
Daubert and its progeny have recently been codified in revisions to Article 7 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Together, they establish a new role for trial
judges with respect to expert testimony by requiring judges to serve as
gatekeepers charged with barring unreliable "specialized knowledge" from the
courtroom. 19  These new strictures reflect an increased skepticism about
expertise and its value in adjudication. 20 Courts are far more cautious today than
they were ten years ago about allowing untested expert "knowledge" into the
juror's invocation of "life experience, or education or professional background" is not grounds for
overturning verdict); State v. Heitkemper, 538 N.W.2d 561,564 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (permitting jurors
to "rely on their common sense and life's experience during deliberations" including individual's
expertise).
17. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915) (noting that the jury deliberation is
meant to be private and would otherwise be subject to public scrutiny). The Court in McDonald
summarized the policy reasons underlying the principle of jury secrecy as follows:
[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can
be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all
verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering
something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the
defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish
misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the
result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject
of public investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and
conference.
Id.
18. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19. The new rules have spawned an enormous amount of academic commentary. See generally
Sarah Brew, Where the Rubber Hits the Road. Steering the Trial Court Through a Post-Kumho Tire
Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 467 (2000) (analyzing trial courts'
gatekeeper function after Kumho Tire); Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament:
Determining "Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test ofDaubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000) (proposing method for trial
judges to use in evaluating "reliability"); Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The
Ups, the Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the "Gatekeeper" Function to
Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of Daubert. 34 AKRON L. REV. 689
(2001) (examining historical and current treatment of scientific and non-scientific expert testimony).
20. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 4-5
(arguing that proliferation of junk science at trial has resulted in inaccurate jury verdicts); Peter J.
Goss et al., Clearing Away the Junk: Court-Appointed Experts, Scientifically Marginal Evidence, and
the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation, 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 227, 229 (2001) (describing Daubert as
"a bulwark against junk science"); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WiS. L. REV. 1113, 1121-24
(1991) (recounting widely-criticized case in which judge based decision on expert testimony that had




So far, however, judicial scrutiny has focused almost exclusively on
expertise brought to the decision-making process through witnesses. The courts
and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence have concentrated on the dual
objectives of, first, ensuring that the expert testimony offered at trial meets basic
standards of reliability,22 and second, preventing lawyers from eluding the new
restrictions by offering specialized knowledge in lay-testimony dress.23 Notably
absent from the courts' decisions or the deliberations on amendments to the
rules has been any systematic consideration of the problems that might arise
when a juror brings potentially relevant specialized knowledge into the jury
room.
In this article, I argue that the new focus on the risks of spurious "expertise"
compels attention to the problem of juror expertise.24 Specialized knowledge
poses the same risks to the truth-seeking objectives of trial whether it enters the
decision-making process through expert testimony or through the back door of
juror background knowledge. In fact, the risks to accuracy may be less when
expertise is offered by a witness than when it is introduced by a juror, because
the witness will be subject to cross-examination and rebuttal. Flawed expertise
brought to the case by a juror is not subject to cross-examination or rebuttal, and
in most cases is entirely hidden from view. It thus poses special risks in criminal
cases-even beyond the threat to accuracy-because of criminal defendants'
constitutional rights to be confronted with and to confront the evidence against
them.
25
Because any effort to regulate jury conduct potentially trenches on
important principles of deliberative freedom and secrecy, the circumscription of
21. See, e.g., Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 566 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (providing
graphic example of courts' new resistance to untested expert testimony). In Stanczyk, a products
liability action, the plaintiff made the standard argument that there was a safer alternative design for
the saw in question. Id. at 566. Plaintiff's expert, a mechanical engineer, offered to testify that he
could design a safer saw. Id. But the trial judge excluded the expert testimony as failing the Daubert
test. Id. at 568. The court suggested that the expert would have had to actually build and test the
alternative design to comply with Daubert. Id. at 567-68.
22. See FED. R. EvID. 702 (permitting expert testimony only where "(1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case").
23. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (limiting lay opinion to testimony that is "not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702").
24. In focusing on those topics of juror background knowledge that implicate the Daubert
principle, I exclude from consideration the problem of jurors who are attorneys introducing their
opinions on the governing law. That is a distinct problem because it does not involve background
knowledge used to determine the facts of the case, but rather knowledge used to understand either
courtroom procedures or the application of the law to the facts. See Stewart v. Amusements of Am.,
No. 96-1537, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16306, at *12 (4th Cir. Jul. 15, 1998) (holding that attorney-juror's
statements that jury could not send notes to judge and that jury had to reach compromise did not "fall
within the category of personal knowledge of facts specific to the litigation" and did not constitute
"extraneous information" under Rule 606(b)).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 5 (giving criminal defendant right "to be confronted with the
witness against him").
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jury background knowledge requires delicate balancing.26 The standard for
when a juror's knowledge falls so far out of the bounds of common knowledge to
implicate evidentiary concerns must be flexible. No bright-line test will suffice.
Instead, judges must make subtle determinations in individual cases considering
a range of factors designed to focus attention on the policy reasons for concern
about expertise in the courtroom.
Furthermore, judges must have flexibility in redressing the problem where it
exists. I will argue that the best place for redress is before the problem emerges:
in jury selection. Where a juror possesses impermissibly specialized background
knowledge that overlaps with the central issues in the case, the juror should be
subject to a strike for cause. Where the presence or importance of such
background knowledge appears later, judges should act with caution. They
should be willing to overturn verdicts on that ground, but only in cases where the
introduction of a juror's specialized knowledge poses clear risks to constitutional
rights or other fundamental policy concerns.
I begin my argument in Part II by fleshing out the reasons why it is
important at this time to rethink the problem of juror expertise. In Part III, I
articulate a standard for permissible juror background knowledge by considering
the existing case law on point and the analogical topic of the distinction between
lay and expert witnesses. Finally, in Part IV, I consider possible means of
addressing the problem. I analyze the approaches courts have taken and then
suggest a framework for courts to use going forward. Throughout, I emphasize
the need for careful regulation in this area. Juror expertise poses a real problem,
but it is a problem whose solution must not compromise the essential value of
the jury system.
II. THE NEED FOR REGULATION OF JUROR EXPERTISE
A. The Function of Expertise at Trial
To make competent trial decisions, jurors must have a sufficient body of
background knowledge to make sense of the evidentiary data put before them. 27
Where the jurors are asked to draw inferences about matters beyond the
experience or understanding of most people, however, they may lack sufficient
background knowledge to draw those inferences competently. 28 In general,
26. See Casey v. United States, 20 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1927) (explaining that if new trials were
to be granted whenever jurors recall personal experiences during deliberations, litigation would be
endless).
27. See Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing
presumption in law that jury will perform fact-finding function by rational means and stating this "does
not contemplate scientific precision but does contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of a
fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and reasonable application of the relevant
legal rules").
28. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 447 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (ruling that after mistrial any new trial would be without jury, because "[t]he jurors were
conscientious and diligent, but their past experience had not prepared them to decide a case involving
2002]
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jurors are not disqualified on that ground. We have historically refused calls to
empanel "special juries" or "blue ribbon juries" composed of individuals
possessing expertise in the subject area of the trial.29 Instead, we rely on the
parties to help minimally qualified jurors understand complex or unusual subject
matter by way of testimony from expert witnesses. 30 Rule 702 contemplates that
experts will assist the jurors both by providing the jurors with the "specialized
knowledge" that will enable the jurors to draw the desired inferences and by
explicitly drawing the inferences for the benefit of the jurors.
31
Expert testimony has an evidential character fundamentally distinct from
"factual" evidence. To understand this, think of the trial decision-making
process in syllogistic terms.32 For any inference the jurors draw, the major
premise contains the jurors' background knowledge as it is relevant to the
desired inference. The minor premise contains the specific bit of information
from which the jurors have been asked to draw further inferences. The
conclusion is the inference drawn.33 For example, assume that in a homicide
prosecution a witness takes the stand and testifies that the defendant told the
witness one hour before the victim's death that the defendant intended to kill the
victim. The first inference the jurors must draw involves a credibility
determination: the jurors must decide whether or not to believe the witness that
the threat was made. They make that determination based on their background
knowledge about what makes a person believable. For example, they might
reason as follows:
Major premise: People who are disinterested and speak
confidently should be believed.
Minor premise: This witness is disinterested and speaks
confidently.
technical and financial questions of the highest order").
29. See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 887, 901-916 (1981) (discussing history of "special" or "blue ribbon" juries); id., supra, at 915
(discussing how Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74, was designed to abolish
blue ribbon juries).
30. See CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 23 (John W.
Strong 5th ed. 1999) (noting that experts contribute "the power-the knowledge or skill-to draw
inferences from the facts which a jury could not draw at all or as reliably").
31. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise").
32. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) (explaining syllogistic model of expert inference).
Professor Imwinkelried uses the syllogistic model only in discussing scientific expert testimony. Id. As
I explain in this section, I believe the syllogistic structure is useful for modeling inferences drawn from
any type of evidence.
33. See John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert
Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1992)
(explaining syllogistic structure of trial inferences).
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Conclusion: This witness should be believed.
Drawing that credibility inference allows the jurors to conclude that D
threatened to kill V. To make use of that inference in the case, the jurors must
then draw another inference, which can be formalized as follows:
Major premise: A person who threatens to kill another
person is more likely than others to kill
that person.
Minor premise: D threatened to kill V.
Conclusion: D is more likely than others to have
killed V.
34
It is likely that no one in the courtroom will ever state either of the major
premises used to draw these inferences. Rightly or wrongly, we all tend to
believe that disinterest and confidence are hallmarks of testimonial accuracy.35
And we don't need help to understand the common-sense proposition that a
person who threatens to kill another person is more likely than others to kill that
person. But those bits of background knowledge make possible the ultimate
conclusion that "D is more likely than others to have killed V." Without them,
the witness's testimony that "D threatened to kill V" is just a piece of useless
data.
Imagine now a case in which the jury is asked to draw a more complex
inference. For example, consider the facts of Voegeli v. Lewis, 36 a medical
malpractice case in which a plaintiff who had been in a motorcycle accident went
to the emergency room complaining of knee pain, coldness of the leg and toes,
and an inability to move the toes. The treating physician, believing the leg was
merely broken, put it in a cast. Several days later, after the plaintiff complained
of continuing pain, the physician performed surgery during which it was
determined that the plaintiff was suffering from impaired circulation in the leg,
which necessitated a partial amputation. 37 The central question in the case was
whether the physician should have recognized the possibility of impaired
circulation from the plaintiff's initial symptoms. 38 To draw competent inferences
on this point, the jurors needed to be able to reason as follows:
Major premise: Knee pain associated with foot and leg
34. There is a long-standing debate about the proper way to formalize factual trial inferences.
Compare JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 17 (1913) (describing trial
inferences as inductive and ignoring major premises), with George F. James, Relevancy, Probability
and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689 (1941) (criticizing Wigmore for downplaying significance of
unstated major premises). For my purposes, the usefulness of the syllogistic structure lies in its
demonstration of how general and specific bits of information are combined in the inferential process.
Whether one considers these inferences to be inductive or deductive, and if deductive, whether one
considers them to be valid, is of no importance for my analysis.
35. See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 178-87 (1990) (summarizing psychological studies showing deficiency of
common sense evaluations of witness credibility).
36. 568 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1977).
37. Voegeli, 568 F.2d at 91-92.
38. Id. at 92-93.
2002]
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coolness and an inability to move the ankle
and foot is symptomatic of impaired
circulation.
Minor premise: P exhibited knee pain associated with foot and
leg coolness and an inability to move his ankle
and foot.
Conclusion: P exhibited symptoms of impaired circulation.
Most people untrained in medicine do not know the typical symptoms of
impaired circulation or many other afflictions. This is not common knowledge of
the sort we presume the jurors possess. The jurors needed help to draw the
desired inference, and the help came in the form of expert witnesses who
provided the jurors with the relevant background medical knowledge.
39
As with all testimony, expert testimony calls for an initial credibility
determination: the jurors must decide which, if any, of the expert witnesses to
believe. But at that point, the functions of expert testimony and "factual"
testimony diverge. Testimony by "fact" witnesses, as well as physical and
documentary evidence, is sifted through the jurors' credibility filters and, if
believed, used to establish the specific facts of the various minor premises the
jurors will consider in drawing inferences about the case. Testimony by expert
witnesses is sifted through the jurors' credibility filters and then used to help
establish the major premises that make conclusions about the facts of the case
possible .40
The difference is significant because of the difference in what we expect the
jurors to bring to the case with respect to these two classes of information.
Again, jurors typically may not have any knowledge of the specific facts at issue
in the case, or at least must set any pre-existing knowledge aside in deciding the
case. 41 All the minor premises they employ in their reasoning must come from
the evidence adduced at trial. But jurors must have a fairly significant body of
background knowledge-the stuff of the major premises-in order to assess the
evidence put before them.42 This difference means that it is much harder to draw
lines between the permissible and impermissible background knowledge the
jurors may contribute than between the permissible and impermissible specific
39. See id. at 93 (discussing expert testimony offered in case). As is usually the case, the experts
differed on this point. The jury found for the defendant. In reviewing the trial court's denial of the
plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court concluded that "[t]here
is no doubt that Dr. Lewis should have known and did know that the injury to the knee could have
been accompanied by circulatory damage." Id. at 94. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the denial of
the motion because the evidence of proximate cause was in dispute. Id.
40. See Strong, supra note 33, at 352-53 (explaining role of expert witnesses as providing general
propositions required to draw factual inferences). In this insightful and prescient article, Professor
Strong goes on to identify four ways in which expert testimony may be "of assistance" to the jury
under Rule 702. See id. at 358-60.
41. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.121(1)(a) (2001) (requiring that no juror share her
knowledge of "any fact relating to the case" with other jurors).
42. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, at 102-06 (describing use of juror background
knowledge).
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factual knowledge the jurors may contribute.
B. The Risks of Expertise at Trial
Nevertheless, the lines must be drawn. Our adjudicative system depends on
the principle that cases be decided based solely on admitted evidence. 43 The
data that forms the minor premises in the jurors' inferences unquestionably
constitutes evidence to which that principle applies. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b), and a long line of cases, jurors may not investigate the facts of
the case on their own, as their verdict may be compromised if they learn about
the facts of the case through avenues "extraneous" to the evidentiary process.44
To the extent the background knowledge that forms the major premises exceeds
the bounds of common knowledge, Daubert and its progeny make clear that it
too must be considered evidence and filtered through appropriate procedural
rules.
In the pre-Daubert world, courts barely scrutinized most expert testimony,
leaving it to the jury to sort the credible testimony from the junk.45 Testimony
that could be considered "scientific" was subjected in at least some jurisdictions
to the "general acceptance" test enunciated by the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia in Frye v. United States.46 But non-scientific expert
testimony-testimony on topics ranging from handwriting 47 to banking4 8 and
attorney fees 49 to drug use 5 0-often received no scrutiny at all.51 Instead, courts
tended to accept the testimony of a witness apparently qualified as an expert in a
given field based on nothing more than the expert's own assurances of
43. See United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing
historical transition from jurors with personal knowledge of facts of case to indifferent jurors).
44. FED. R. EviD. 606(b). See Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1999)
(granting new trial where juror conducted unauthorized test of vehicle seat belt); Snook v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 485 So. 2d 496, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (remanding for interview of jurors
where juror made unauthorized visit to tire installation garage and interviewed service technicians);
State v. Abell, 383 N.W.2d 810, 813 (N.D. 1986) (granting new trial where jurors consulted dictionary
given to them by bailiff); see also Finley, supra note 2 (providing history of rule prohibiting jurors from
using personal knowledge to reach verdict).
45. See Strong, supra note 33, at 362 (concluding that under common-law relevancy standard
advanced by McCormick, "the principles underlying expert testimony were almost immune to the
imposition of any sort of reliability standard").
46. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
47. See United States v. Herrera, 832 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1987) (allowing expert opinion on
handwriting).
48. See United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1981) (permitting expert opinion on
banking matters).
49. See Arrow, Edelstein & Gross, P.C. v. Rosco Prod. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 520, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (allowing testimony about reasonable value of attorney's fees).
50. See United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing testimony
about source of marijuana).
51. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of NonScientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO
L. REv. 2271, 2280-81 (1994) (discussing courts' adoption of "laissez-faire attitude toward the




Under that permissive regime, there was little reason to consider the risks of
juror expertise. Jurors were routinely presented with testimony from expert
witnesses having little or no guarantee of reliability.5 3 Only relatively minor
additional harm could result from a juror contributing his own dubious
"specialized knowledge" behind the veil of the jury room.
Under the new standards for expert testimony, however, the problem of
juror expertise takes on a new importance. Daubert rested on the principle that
scientific testimony must constitute "knowledge. '54 As the Supreme Court
phrased it when describing trial judges' gatekeeper role, the "overarching subject
[of the inquiry] is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.''55 The Court
thus recognized the risks to the decision-making process posed by the injection
of speculative information into the major premises used by the jurors to draw
inferences, 56 and attempted to cabin the testimony of experts to minimize that
risk by requiring that judges allow only reliable scientific testimony.
57
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,58 the Supreme Court expressly
recognized that the need for reliability extends beyond the scientific evidence
covered by Daubert to all types of expert testimony.59 The Court's rationale
demonstrates its underlying concern that jurors not base their decisions on faulty
background information:
Experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of
what Judge Learned Hand called "general truths derived from...
specialized experience." And whether the specific expert testimony
focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized translation of
those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the
application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert's testimony
52. See id. at 2281 (stating "courts tend to uncritically accept a nonscientific expert's claim that
the proposition he or she proposes testifying to is reliable").
53. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1929, at 38-39 (3d ed. 1978) (arguing
that rule permitting expert testimony "has done more than any one rule ... to reduce our litigation to
a state of legalized gambling").
54. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
55. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 597 (stating "conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the
project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment-often of great consequence-about a
particular set of events in the past").
57. It should be noted that questions were raised almost immediately after Daubert came down
about judges' competence to perform the role of scientific gatekeeper. On remand in Daubert, Judge
Kozinski concluded that "though we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of
the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those
experts' proposed testimony amounts to 'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,' and was
'derived by the scientific method."' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995); see also Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1551-53 (1998) (questioning capacity of non-expert judges to assess scientific testimony).
58. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
59. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149 (concluding that Daubert's general principles apply to all
expert matters of Rule 702).
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often will rest "upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the
jury's] own." The trial judge's effort to assure that the specialized
testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate foreign
experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge. 60
After Kumho, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to codify the
gatekeeper function. 61  Reiterating the Supreme Court's concerns about
unreliable specialized knowledge, the Advisory Committee explained that "[t]he
trial judge in all cases of proffered expert testimony must find that it is properly
grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted." 62
The new standards for expert testimony recognize the critical risks to the
adjudicative process posed by the use of faulty "expertise" as a basis for drawing
inferences about the facts of the case. Those risks are as great whether the faulty
expertise appears by way of in-court testimony or through the back door of jury
deliberation. In either case, the end result is that the jurors will use faulty major
premises in drawing inferences about the material facts of the case. An
inference is only as good as the major premise from which it is drawn. A jury
decision is equally bad whether based on a fallacious major premise received by
an "expert" witness or on a fallacious major premise advanced by an "expert"
juror.
If anything, the risks are even greater when a juror advances fallacies,
because the system's normal controls cannot operate. In responding to the
argument that removing Frye's "general acceptance" test would result in a
"pseudoscientific" "free-for-all," the Daubert Court emphasized the value of
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof" as ways of ensuring against over-reliance on
questionable expertise.63 But when a juror offers questionable expertise, two out
of those three checks-cross-examination and the presentation of contrary
evidence-are unavailable. Given the difficulty jurors have understanding most
instructions, 64 eliminating those two checks leaves very little of value to
counteract the effect of misguided juror expertise.
The risks posed by juror expertise are particularly troubling in criminal
cases. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be confronted by the
evidence against him.65 And Daubert/Kumho and the new Rule 702 make clear
that special risks attend the introduction of specialized knowledge into evidence.
60. Id. at 148-49 (citations omitted).
61. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing expert testimony admissible only if "(1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case").
62. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
63. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.
64. See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.L. REV. 77, 78 (1988) (noting research shows juror comprehension of
instructions to be extremely low).
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him").
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Given those facts, expertise offered by a juror in a criminal case is doubly
problematic: it cannot be screened through the "gatekeeper" process and the
defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine it, or even to be made aware of
its existence. Criminal defendants thus have profound reason for concern when
expertise is offered by a juror as a basis for drawing inferences against them.
Put simply, the new standards governing expert testimony compel attention
to the problem of juror expertise. To give full effect to the principles underlying
those standards, judges must have both a standard for determining when a
juror's background knowledge implicates areas regulated by the new rules on
expertise, and an enforcement mechanism akin to Daubert's gatekeeper role for
expert testimony. The remainder of this article discusses those points.
III. DEFINING EXPERTISE
The first and most difficult step in addressing the problem of juror expertise
is to define the point at which the knowledge a juror brings to the case so far
exceeds common experience as to call for filtering through the evidentiary
process. A number of courts have faced this question in the context of attempts
to impeach jury verdicts on the grounds that a particular juror's expertise
constitutes extrinsic evidence under Rule 608(b) or its state equivalent.
Unfortunately, these courts have failed to offer concrete guidance on the
permissible scope of juror knowledge. The decisions tend to be conclusory,
resting on unexplained assertions that a juror's knowledge is too "specialized" or
too close to "expert" testimony to be permitted. 66 Constructing a standard thus
requires resort to other sources of authority. In this section, I will attempt to
construct a standard both by analyzing the case law on point and by considering
the analogous problem of distinguishing expert from lay testimony.
A. Juror Expertise Case Law
Most cases addressing the permissible scope of juror background knowledge
arise on motions for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct. To succeed on
such a motion, the movant must first show that extraneous information was
brought to the jury's attention, and second, that the information prejudiced the
moving party.67 Many courts have simply refused to find that the pre-existing
experience and information a juror brings to the trial can constitute extraneous
information, no matter how "specialized" that experience or information is.
68
But a handful of courts have found that a juror's specialized knowledge can
constitute extraneous information, and their decisions give at least some
guidance as to the standard for the permissible scope of juror background
66. See, e.g., State v. Thacker, 596 P.2d 508, 509 (Nev. 1979) (upholding grant of new trial in
cattle larceny case in which juror who was cattle rancher, "drawing on his special knowledge of cattle
and feed," computed estimate of weight of cattle).
67. See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of this process.
68. See supra note 16 and cited cases for illustrations of courts refusing to intervene in juror
background challenges.
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knowledge.
I will focus on the decisions of the three jurisdictions with the most
developed bodies of case law on this issue: Texas, Washington, and New York.
The courts of these states seem to have adopted three different standards for the
limitation of juror background knowledge, with Texas, until a recent about-face,
adopting the most restrictive position, Washington adopting a middle position,
and New York adopting the most liberal position. I treat them in that order.
1. Texas
Texas has both the most developed body of law on the topic of juror
background knowledge and the most quixotic. Until recently, Texas limited the
permissible scope of juror background knowledge more than any other state.
69
Some of the older cases in which Texas courts overturned jury verdicts include
the following:
* In a railroad accident case, a juror who was a railroad fireman
contradicted testimony by witnesses that the track rails were dry the
night of the accident by telling the other jurors that track rails are
always wet at night.
70
- In a wrongful death action based on the electrocution of a city-
employed lineman, a juror who had been a lineman told the other
jurors that the deceased should have been working on the line from
below instead of from above, as he was when he was electrocuted.
71
- In an action to recover for defects in an automobile, a juror with
experience working with cars told the other jurors that if the car had
had the defects complained of, it would not have run as long as it did.
72
* In a criminal prosecution for illegal manufacture of liquor, a juror
who was a druggist told the other jurors that the defendant's claim that
he was making vinegar was not believable because alcohol could not be
used to make vinegar in the way the defendant claimed.
73
*In an action to recover for defects in the construction of a house, the
jury disregarded the trial testimony on the cost of repair and accepted
instead the cost estimates made by juror who was a contractor.
74
These cases are almost bereft of analysis. Only one mentions the word
69. Texas has historically allowed more inquiry into jury deliberations in general than probably
any other state, because from 1905 through 1983, it allowed inquiry into "overt acts" in the jury room,
including communications, although not into mental processes. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Archery, Inc.
v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 367-68 (Tex. 2000) (discussing historical development of Texas rule on
impeachment of jury verdicts); see also Kris L. Landrith, Note, Invasion of Jury Deliberations: Existing
Rules and Suggested Changes, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 445, 446 (1971) (describing history of Texas rules
on impeachment of jury verdicts).
70. Hobrecht v. San Antonio & A.P.R. Co., 141 S.W. 579,581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
71. Dunaway v. Austin St. Ry. Co., 195 S.W. 1157, 1159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
72. Manes v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 204 S.W. 235,235-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
73. Rushnetsky v. State, 244 S.W. 372, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922).
74. Plaster v. Roper, 152 S.W.2d 927, 928-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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"expert. '75 The others, to the extent they give an explanation at all, simply refer
to the introduction of "new" or "other" evidence by a juror. But the decisions
suggest a very narrow scope of permissible juror background knowledge. Under
the standard these cases imply, a juror would not be permitted to discuss in the
jury room any experiences that fall outside the realm of routine daily life. 76 Even
relatively banal observations, like the fact that a seriously defective car should
not run very long, fall outside the permissible scope.77 In effect, these decisions
would limit juror background knowledge to those subjects that virtually
everyone knows.
A number of more recent Texas cases have also adopted that restrictive
position. In Deary v. Texas,78 a 1984 case adopting perhaps the narrowest view
of permissible juror background knowledge possible, the defendant was charged
with shoplifting a cassette player.79 The price tag on the player gave a price of
$200 and the merchandising manager testified that the player was worth $200,
but there was some question as to whether that price included speakers, which
the defendant was not accused of stealing.80 One of the jurors told the others
that he had experience shopping for stereo equipment and that he believed it
was reasonable to conclude that the cassette player alone cost $200. The
defendant was convicted.81 Without significant analysis, the Court of Appeals
found that this seemingly benign statement constituted the receipt by the jury of
"other evidence"-evidence other than that introduced at trial-and that it was
therefore juror misconduct warranting reversal.82
But in the mid-1980s, Texas radically, albeit indirectly, changed its law in
this area. For decades, Texas had a bifurcated court system, with separate rules
of evidence for its separate criminal and civil courts.8 3 In the mid-1980s, it
enacted two codes of evidence based on the Federal Rules, one for the civil
courts and a second for the criminal courts. 84 The codes wrought dramatic
75. Hobrecht, 141 S.W. at 581.
76. See, e.g., Finlay-Tampico Oil Co. v. Robbins, 246 S.W. 1047, 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923)
(finding misconduct in case involving valuation of oil leases where juror who had purchased similar oil
leases told other jurors amount he had paid).
77. See Manes, 204 S.W. at 236 (finding misconduct where juror, with automobile repair
knowledge, stated that car in question could not function as it had with alleged defects).
78. 681 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App. 1984).
79. Deary, 681 S.W.2d at 785.
80. Id. at 787-88.
81. Id. at 787.
82. Id. at 787-88; see also Hunt v. State, 603 S.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(overturning verdict where juror with military experiences contradicted expert testimony by stating
that strangulation by cord could occur "real quickly").
83. See Kent Caperton & Erwin McGee, Background, Scope and Applicability of the Texas Rules
of Evidence, 20 Hous. L. REV. 49, 52 (1983) (discussing peculiarities of Texas's judicial system).
84. The code of evidence governing civil cases was promulgated in 1983, while the code of
evidence governing criminal cases was promulgated in 1985. See Thomas R. Phillips, Understanding
and Using the Texas Rules of Evidence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1587 n.1 (1989) (reviewing STEVEN
GOODE ET AL., GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1988)). The codes
have since been combined into a single code, TEXAS CODE ANNOTATED, covering all actions.
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changes in the handling of claims of jury misconduct. Up to that time, a juror
was competent to testify about any "overt acts" that occurred in the jury room.
85
Speech was understood to be an "overt act," so that a party could easily probe
the jury's deliberations to determine whether the jury received "other evidence"
in the form of specialized juror background knowledge.
8 6
The new codes, however, adopted provisions based on Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b). Under the new provisions, jurors were permitted to testify
only as to "outside influence" that affected their deliberations. 87 Since the
adoption of these provisions, Texas courts have uniformly concluded that juror
background knowledge is not an "outside influence," and therefore, is not a
proper subject of juror testimony. 88 Consequently, whether or not Texas courts
still believe some types of juror background knowledge constitute improper
"other evidence," they no longer consider juror testimony regarding such
background knowledge in ruling on motions for new trial. The result is that
Texas has moved from a regime of very strict restriction of the knowledge that
jurors may contribute to a regime of no restriction at all.
89
2. Washington
The courts in Washington, although willing to set aside verdicts based on
the use of impermissible juror background knowledge, have taken an approach
85. See M. Joseph Copeland, Note, The Room Without a View: Inquiries Into Jury Misconduct
After the Adoption of Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b), 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 965, 968-69 (1986)
(describing Texas law on impeachment of verdicts prior to adoption of revised evidence code).
86. See Jack Pope, The Mental Operations of Jurors, 40 TEX. L. REV. 849, 853-54 (1962)
(explaining meaning of "overt act" under Texas law of impeachment of verdicts).
87. See TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (allowing a juror to only testify concerning "(1) whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon juror; or (2) to rebut a claim that the juror was
not qualified to serve"). In fact, the Texas version is even more restrictive than the Federal rule, in that
the Texas version allows inquiry only into "outside influence" whereas Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) allows inquiry into both "extraneous prejudicial information" and "outside influence."
Compare TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (allowing a juror to testify only concerning "(1) whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon juror; or (2) to rebut a claim that the juror was not
qualified to serve"), with FED. R. EvID. 606(b) (allowing inquiry into both "extraneous prejudiced
information" and "outside information").
88. Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263,272 (Tex. App. 1994), states this proposition:
'Outside influence' means a force external to the jury and its deliberations. Outside
influence does not include information acquired by a juror and communicated to the others
between the time the trial court instructs the jury and the time it renders a verdict, even
where the information is not in evidence, and is unknown to jurors before trial. Outside
influence, in the form of information not in evidence, must come from a non-juror.
Information introduced into deliberations by a member of the jury, even if submitted with
the intention of influencing and prejudicing a verdict, is not outside influence.
Id. see also Fillinger v. Fuller, 746 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex. App. 1988) (upholding denial of motion for
new trial where juror related experience of his mother with defendant doctor); Baker v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Tex. App. 1987) (upholding order denying motion for new trial
where juror who was registered nurse opined on effect of drugs plaintiff was taking).
89. See, e.g., Crowson v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 11 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 1999) (refusing to
intercede where juror brought into jury room discount formula she had copied out of a textbook).
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more deferential to juries than the one traditionally taken by the Texas courts.
In Halverson v. Anderson,90 the first reported case addressing this subject, a
minor injured in a car accident sought damages for, among other things, lost
earnings. 91 Testimony at trial indicated that the plaintiff hoped to be an airline
pilot but was also studying to be a civil surveyor. 92 One of the jurors told the
others that an airline pilot would earn about $2,000 per month and a civil
surveyor would earn about $1,500 per month.93 The jurors relied on these
numbers to reach their verdict on future lost wages. 94
The Washington Supreme Court held that a new trial should be granted.95
It concluded that the statements by the juror constituted the introduction of
"evidence which was not subject to objection, cross-examination, explanation or
rebuttal" by the parties. 96  The Court did not explain why this juror's
speculations about the earning capacity of pilots and civil surveyors differed
from the many other kinds of speculations that jurors routinely make.97 Nor did
it offer any test for determining when a juror's introduction of pre-existing
knowledge would constitute the improper receipt of "evidence."
Halverson is the only Washington Supreme Court case touching on the
problem of juror background knowledge, and it contains little concrete guidance.
But several of the intermediate appellate courts in Washington have addressed
the issue after Halverson, and they have provided better, though still
unsatisfying, analyses.
In Fritsch v. J.J. Newberry's, Inc.,98 a Washington appellate court considered
a slip and fall case in which a juror recounted in the jury room an earlier
experience in which he had been injured and had been told by an attorney at that
time that he could expect to receive $1,000 per month for pain and suffering. 99
The jury used that figure to calculate the plaintiff's damages in the case before
them.1t ° The appellate court reversed the denial of defendant Newberry's'
motion for a new trial, finding that the juror's comments constituted prejudicial
misconduct. t0 1 The court concluded that "statements such as [this juror's] are in
90. 513 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1973).
91. Halverson, 513 P.2d at 828.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 827-28.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 830-31.
96. Halverson, 513 P.2d at 830.
97. See id. at 831 (Hale, J., dissenting) (noting "doubt that any jury has ever deliberated upon its
verdict free of the kind of remarks and observations described in the court's opinion").
98. 720 P.2d 845 (Wash. App. 1986).
99. Fritsch, 720 P.2d at 846.
100. Id
101. Id. at 846-47. Washington has not adopted a version of Federal Rule of Evidence 606.
Instead, under Washington law, jurors are precluded from impeaching their verdicts by testifying to
matters that "inhere in the verdict." See Gardner v. Malone, 376 P.2d 651, 654 (Wash. 1962) (noting
"crux of the problem is whether that to which the juror testifies in support of a motion for new trial,
inheres in the verdict"). They may, however, testify to matters that do not inhere in the verdict. The
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the nature of expert testimony. It is akin to a jury bringing a book or text into
the jury room which was never admitted into evidence but is relied upon by the
jury in arriving at its verdict. 10 2 The court did not explain the basis for its
conclusion that the juror's knowledge was "in the nature of expert testimony."'
10 3
Several years later, a different Washington appellate court also ordered a
new trial based on impermissible background knowledge. In State v. Briggs,
1° 4
the defendant Briggs was charged with multiple assaults.10 5 Briggs's defense was
mistaken identity, and rested on his theory that although he had a pronounced
stutter, none of the victims noticed that their attacker had a stutter.0 6 One of
the jurors had a speech impediment, which he failed to disclose in response to
direct questions on voir dire. 0 7 The juror then discussed his impediment with
the other jurors in deliberations, telling them that it was possible for a person
who stutters to have periods of time in which he does not stutter.10 8 Briggs was
convicted and moved for a new trial after learning of the juror's comments.10 9
The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion1° The court found that
the juror should have disclosed his speech impediment and that the failure to
disclose was prejudicial because of the comments he made in the jury room.111
The court rejected the prosecution's argument that the comments were not
prejudicial because they involved life experiences that jurors are expected to rely
on in deliberations:
While a jury, in exercising its collective wisdom, is expected to bring its
opinions, insights, common sense, and everyday life experience into
deliberations.., the information related by juror White was of a
different character. It was highly specialized, as evidenced by the fact
that the topic was the subject of expert testimony by a prosecution
witness... This is evidence outside the realm of a typical juror's
general life experience and therefore should not have been introduced
into the jury's deliberations.
1 12
The same appellate court, two years later, again considered the permissible
scope of juror background knowledge. In State v. Carlson,113 the defendant was
convicted of child rape and child molestation. One of the jurors was a recovering
test for whether a matter inheres in the verdict is loose, but can involve consideration of at least two
factors: (1) "whether the facts alleged are linked to the juror's motive, intent, or belief, or describe
their effect on him;" and (2) "whether that to which the juror testifies can be rebutted by other
testimony without probing a juror's mental processes." Id.
102. Fritsch, 720 P.2d at 847.
103. Id.
104. 776 P.2d 1347 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
105. Briggs, 776 P.2d at 1348-49.
106. Id. at 1349.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1355 n.4.
109. Id. at 1349.
110. Briggs, 776 P.2d at 1361.
111. Id. at 1356-57.
112. Id. at 1355-56 (citations omitted).
113. 812 P.2d 536 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
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alcoholic, had read a great deal about dysfunctional families, and knew someone
who had been molested as a child.114 During deliberations, she used the term
"pedophile" several times and said that pedophiles come from all walks of life.11 5
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that these comments constituted
prejudicial extraneous information.11 6 This time the trial court granted the
motion for a new trial, but the appellate court reversed. 117 Citing Briggs, the
appellate court stated that jurors are entitled to bring their opinions, insights,
common sense, and everyday life experiences into deliberations, but may not
introduce "highly specialized knowledge."11 8 The court then concluded that the
jurors' comments did not constitute "highly specialized knowledge."'1 9 "[The
juror's] comment that child abusers come from all walks of life was a simple
commonsense observation. Her use of the term 'pedophile' indicates that [she]
has a good vocabulary, but hardly qualifies as introducing specialized knowledge
or specific facts to the jury."
120
The decisions of the Washington courts are difficult to reconcile. It seems
clear, in the courts' use of the terms "expert" and "highly specialized
knowledge," that these courts permit a greater scope for juror background
knowledge than the Texas courts traditionally did; mere knowledge of stereo
sales practices, for example, almost certainly would not concern the Washington
courts because such knowledge does not require an "expert" with "highly
specialized knowledge." But it is not at all clear where the Washington courts
would draw the line, because of the dearth of analysis in their opinions. The very
use of the terms "expert" and "specialized knowledge," however, may provide a
clue.
The terms "expert" and "highly specialized knowledge" come from Rules
701 and 702 and the modern doctrine on expert witnesses. Under these rules, a
witness must be treated as an "expert" if she is testifying to matters of
"specialized knowledge." 121  In using this terminology to circumscribe juror
background knowledge, the Washington courts may be suggesting that the line
dividing permissible from impermissible juror background knowledge is the
same as the line dividing lay from expert testimony. 122 The Fritsch court in




118. Id. at 543 (citing State v. Briggs 776 P.2d 1347, 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)).
119. Carlson, 812 P.2d at 543.
120. Id.
121. See FED. R. EVID. 701 & 702 (noting that a witness is an expert when she testifies to matters
of specialized knowledge).
122. Cf. Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 796 P.2d 737, 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). In
Richards, a doctor on the jury related his medical knowledge during deliberations. Richards, 796 P.2d
at 740. Citing Halverson, Fritsch, and Briggs, the court noted that "[tihe interpretation of the evidence
interjected by [the juror] may well be outside the realm of a typical juror's general life experience and
would not usually be introduced into the jury's deliberations." Id. at 743. But the court held that the
party seeking to overturn the verdict had waived any right to object because the doctor's knowledge
[Vol. 75
THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPERT JUROR
particular seemed to draw this line by concluding that the juror's comments on
the appropriate measure of pain and suffering damages "were in the nature of
expert testimony"' 23 and thus were an inappropriate subject for jury
deliberation.
If in fact this is the line the Washington courts would draw, it presents a
distinctly different approach from that taken by the older Texas courts. While
the Texas courts permitted jurors to relate only those experiences that virtually
everyone has shared, the Washington courts seem to permit juror background
knowledge up to the point at which it would be considered "specialized
knowledge"-and hence require the testimony of an expert witness instead of a
lay witness-under Rules 701 and 702.124
3. New York
The New York courts have suggested a limitation on juror background
knowledge rooted in the common-law test for when expert testimony is
permissible. People v. MaraghJ25 is the leading case. The defendant in Maragh
was convicted of murdering his girlfriend. 126 The prosecution's theory was that
the defendant repeatedly punched his girlfriend in the abdomen, causing loss of
blood and death. 127 The defense called a doctor as an expert witness. 128 The
doctor testified that the victim died from a cardiac event rather than from blood
loss. 129 He testified that signs of ventricular fibrillation found in the autopsy
were inconsistent with death from loss of blood. 130 One of the jurors was a nurse
who told the other jurors that she had seen patients suffer ventricular fibrillation
as a result of blood loss. 131 The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the
nurse-juror's comments constituted misconduct. 132 The trial court granted the
was brought out during voir dire and he was allowed to remain on the jury. Id. A dissenting judge
argued that the parties waived the right to object to the doctor's remaining on the jury, but not to
object to his recitation of his own past experiences that were analogous to the events under
consideration. Id. at 745 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
123. Fritsch, 720 P.2d at 847.
124. Carlson does not contradict this position because the subject of the juror's background
knowledge in that case probably would not be admissible either through lay or expert witnesses. The
proposition that "pedophiles" come from all walks of life is relevant only on the question of
credibility-either of the prosecution's witnesses or of the defendant, if he testifies to protest his
innocence. Courts are very reluctant to allow testimony on the credibility of witnesses beyond opinion
or reputation. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) & 608(a) (regarding testimony on witness credibility).
125. 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000).
126. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 703.
127. Id. at 702.
128. Id. at 703.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 703.
132. Id. at 703. New York has not codified a version of the Federal Rules of Evidence. New
York has a statute on impeachment of verdicts, which states that a court may set aside a verdict if it
finds that:
[Diuring the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper conduct by a
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motion, but the Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed.
133
On appeal from the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals reversed and
ordered a new trial. 134 The court stated that "grave potential for prejudice is...
present.., when a juror who is a professional in everyday life shares expertise to
evaluate and draw an expert conclusion about a material issue in the case that is
distinct from and additional to the medical proofs adduced at trial. ' 135 The court
then set forth a test for determining when impermissible juror background
knowledge warrants reversal:
[A] reversible error can materialize from (1) jurors conducting
personal specialized assessments not within the common ken of juror
experience and knowledge (2) concerning a material issue in the case,
and (3) communicating that expert opinion to the rest of the jury panel
with the force of private untested truth as though it were evidence.
1 36
The court found, without further analysis, that the nurse-juror's comments met
this test.
137
In the court's formulation, the phrase "not within the common ken of juror
experience and knowledge" is significant as it invokes the common-law standard
for when expert testimony is permitted.1 38 At common-law, opinion testimony in
general was much more strictly regulated than it is today. A lay witness could
give an opinion only where it was not possible to break an inference down into
its factual components. 139 An expert witness could give an opinion only where
the subject of the expert's testimony was "beyond the ken" of the average
juror.140 Although many courts cited the "beyond the ken" standard, few
explained precisely what it meant.1 41 But it seems clear that the test represented
juror, or improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror, which may have affected
a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to the defendant prior to the
rendition of the verdict.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.30(2) (McKinney 2001).
133. People v. Maragh, 691 N.Y.S.2d 918, 918-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), rev'd, 729 N.E.2d 701,
703 (N.Y. 2000).
134. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 706.
135. Id. at 704.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 705.
138. Id. at 704-705.
139. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the
Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CuMB. L. REv. 185, 194-96 (2000) (discussing common law
distinctions between lay opinion and expert testimony).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525, 534 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing "beyond the ken"
standard and holding expert testimony not required on question of foreseeability of accident); United
States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 667 (3d Cir. 1966) (citing "beyond the ken" standard
without explanation); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (citing
"beyond the ken" standard and holding that diagnosis of mental condition is suitable subject of expert
testimony); LaPlante v. Radisson Hotel Co., 292 F. Supp. 705, 707 (D. Minn. 1968) (holding that issue
of whether banquet was overly crowded was not "beyond the ken" of lay person and so expert
testimony was not warranted); Hill v. Parker, 122 P.2d 476, 482 (Wash. 1942) (requiring expert
testimony in medical malpractice case because issues were "beyond the ken" of laypersons); Mayer v.
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a relatively high hurdle to offering expert testimony: if the jurors were capable of
understanding the subject matter of the testimony, the expert would not be
permitted to testify.
1 42
Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 were intended to liberalize these
rules. Rule 701 provides that a lay witness may give an opinion whenever one
would be "helpful" to the jury.143 Rule 702 provides that a qualified witness may
offer "specialized knowledge" whenever doing so would "assist" the jury.144
Under these rules, significantly more opinion and expert testimony is allowed
than was traditionally allowed under the common-law standards. 145 Hence, if the
"beyond the ken" standard is revived to govern the permissible scope of juror
background knowledge, it gives a freer rein to the jury than would be provided
by a test limiting juror knowledge to subjects not falling within Rule 702, as the
Washington courts at least superficially suggested.
Although courts like Fritsch somewhat lazily use the terminology of Rules
701 and 702 in defining the scope of juror background knowledge, these rules are
ill-suited to perform that function. By requiring merely that expert testimony
"assist" the jury, Rule 702 seems to contemplate that expert testimony may
include matters within the competence of the jury. 146 Thus, under Rule 702, the
range of permissible juror knowledge almost certainly overlaps to some degree
with the range of permissible expert testimony. If there is a limit to juror
background knowledge, it would appear to take in at least some matters that
constitute "specialized knowledge" within the meaning of Rule 702.
The "beyond the ken" test employed by Maragh is more promising; by
providing that juror background knowledge is suspect only if it is beyond the ken
of the average juror, this test gives a wider berth to juror knowledge than a
standard based on Rule 702 would provide. But the "beyond the ken" test is not
free of problems. Again, although "beyond the ken" is ritually cited as the
common-law test for the admissibility of expert testimony, very few common-law
cases actually discuss the standard in any depth.1 47 A standard formulation is the
one that appears in McCormick's treatise: "The subject of the inference must be
so distinctively related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to
Hornberger, 28 Pa. D. & C. 714, 716 (1936) (holding that testimony about characteristics of brush fires
is "beyond the ken" of average person and suitable for expert testimony).
142. See Strong, supra note 33, at 356 (discussing how 'beyond the ken' rule "somewhat
unrealistically suggested a division of subjects into those about which the jury was informed and those
which it was not, with expert testimony supplementing only what was conceived of as a complete lack
of knowledge").
143. FED. R. EVID. 701.
144. FED. R. EvID. 702.
145. See Strong, supra note 33, at 357-59 for a discussion of ways in which Rule 702 permits more
expert testimony than was allowed under 'beyond the ken' standard.
146. See Strong, supra note 33, at 359 (noting that under Rule 702 expert witnesses may provide
"a fuller or more systematic collection of data which supplements general propositions already
available to the jury by providing an assessment of the degree of confidence which may be placed in
them").
147. See supra note 141 for cases relying on "beyond the ken" standard.
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be beyond the ken of lay persons." 148 That formula suggests two possible
interpretations. First, "beyond the ken" could refer to any subject that, as a
practical matter, is known only by people who are specialists in a particular field.
Such a matter is "beyond the ken" in the sense of being beyond the actual
knowledge of the typical person. Alternatively, "beyond the ken" could refer
only to subjects that are too complex or otherwise too difficult for the typical
person to understand without extensive training, education, or experience. Such
a matter is "beyond the ken" in the sense of being beyond the capacity for
understanding.
A decision from the New York Court of Appeals applying Maragh seems to
adopt the latter understanding of "beyond the ken." In People v. Arnold,149 the
defendant was accused of assaulting his former girlfriend.150 He claimed that he
had acted in self-defense after she attacked him with a razor blade. 51 One of the
prospective jurors said in voir dire that she had a minor degree in women's
studies, had done substantial research on domestic violence and battered
women's syndrome, and therefore believed she was ill-suited to sit on the jury. 152
After the defendant's request for a challenge for cause was denied, he used a
peremptory challenge on the juror. 153 He was convicted and appealed arguing
that it was error to deny the challenge for cause.
154
The defendant made several arguments for reversal. His primary argument
was that the challenge for cause should have been granted because the juror did
not unequivocally state that she could render an unbiased decision.1 55 He won
on that argument before both the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals.156 In addition, he argued that under Maragh, the trial judge was
required to exclude the juror-regardless of any assurance of impartiality-
because of the potential for her to become an unsworn expert witness.157 The
Court of Appeals rejected that argument, concluding that the juror's knowledge
was not sufficiently uncommon to fall under Maragh.158 "The fact that the juror
had studied domestic violence in college did not demonstrate that she had
specialized knowledge that would enable her to exert undue influence on her
fellow jurors. '159 Instead, the Court read Maragh to apply only where "an
'expert' juror performs 'expert' scientific analysis-requiring knowledge of facts
beyond those presented at trial-and convinces the other jurors to disregard the
148. See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 13 at 23.
149. 753 N.E.2d 846 (N.Y. 2001).
150. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 849.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 850.
154. Id. at 849-50.
155. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 849-50.
156. People v. Arnold, 272 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), aff d, 753 N.E.2d 846, 851
(N.Y. 2001).
157. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 853.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 854.
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trial testimony and instead rely on his expertise."' 16
The Arnold court's concern seems to be with a juror who possesses
knowledge-such as "scientific" knowledge-that is so difficult for the other
jurors to understand, and so persuasive, that the jurors rely solely on that juror's
judgment without evaluating the evidence for themselves. 161 Certainly medical
knowledge like that imparted by the nurse-juror in Maragh fits that criterion.
Knowledge of battered woman syndrome apparently does not, and it seems
likely that much of the background knowledge disapproved by the Texas and
Washington courts also would not. For example, the knowledge about stereo
pricing excluded by the Deary court almost certainly would fail to meet the
criterion. 162 The knowledge about speech impediments imparted by the juror in
Briggs also seems to be information easily understood and easily discounted by
typical jurors. 163 Thus, New York law appears to give wider leeway to juror
background knowledge than either the older Texas courts or the Washington
courts.
4. Summary
Because of the paucity of analysis and the factual variation in the cases
addressing this issue, categorizing the decisions involves making some inferential
leaps. The courts themselves may not have a clear notion of why they made a
particular decision, and the choices they made yesterday could be repudiated
tomorrow, as has happened in Texas. Given that caveat, however, it appears
that three rough approaches to limiting the scope of juror background
knowledge evolved out of the three jurisdictions.
The approach adopted by the older Texas cases is by far the most
restrictive. Those cases effectively barred a juror from offering any background
knowledge except that which is shared by virtually everyone. Reacting to the
excess of that approach, the Texas courts have, for all practical purposes, joined
the list of jurisdictions that do not regulate juror background knowledge. The
Washington courts do regulate juror background knowledge, but under a more
liberal standard than that adopted in the older Texas cases. They apparently bar
a juror from offering background knowledge that would be the subject of expert
testimony-as opposed to lay testimony-if offered at trial. The New York
courts are even more liberal in the background knowledge they allow than the
Washington courts. They apparently bar a juror from offering background
160. Id. at 854.
161. The New York courts may employ a different standard when a juror offers opinions on the
governing law that contradict the judge's instructions. See Edbauer v. Bd. of Ed. of N. Tonawanda,
731 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (awarding new trial where juror with personal injury
settlement experience persuaded other jurors, in contravention of jury instructions, to award plaintiff
only present value of total damages assigned).
162. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of permissible juror
background knowledge in Deary.
163. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of permissible juror
background knowledge in Briggs.
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knowledge only where that knowledge is so complex as to be beyond the
capacity of the ordinary juror to understand.
B. Attempts to Distinguish Lay from Expert Testimony
Again, there are problems with using the distinction between lay and expert
testimony to draw lines between permissible and impermissible juror
background knowledge. Where Rule 701 purports to delineate mutually
exclusive domains for lay and expert witnesses, 164 Rule 702 contemplates that the
domain of expert witnesses will overlap with that of the jury. 165 Still, tests for
distinguishing lay from expert testimony can help in formulating a standard for
identifying the point at which a juror's knowledge falls so far outside the bounds
of common knowledge as to pose unacceptable risks to the adjudicative process.
In this section, I consider two of the more prominent tests for distinguishing lay
from expert testimony.
1. The "Process of Reasoning" Test
The witness who presents the greatest classification problems is the witness
who possesses unique knowledge about some fact. For example, typically one
spouse can identify the other spouse's handwriting, but only a handful of other
people could. Arguably that knowledge of the spouse's handwriting constitutes
"specialized knowledge" gained through "experience" within the meaning of
Rule 702. The question thus arises whether testimony by a spouse authenticating
the other spouse's signature is "expert testimony," with all the restrictions that
designation carries.
In its note to the amended Rule 701, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence answered this question in the negative by drawing a
distinction between "specialized knowledge" and "particularized knowledge."'
1 66
It used as an example a witness who was the owner of a business and testified to
the value of the business without first qualifying as an expert in accounting or
appraisal. 167 "Such opinion testimony is admitted not because of experience,
training or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but because of
the particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her position
in the business."' 168 The Advisory Committee then further explained this
distinction by reference to the case State v. Brown, 69 in which the Tennessee
164. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (providing that lay witnesses may not testify to areas of "specialized
knowledge"). Mutual exclusion is required, at least in theory, because of the different rules that apply
to lay and expert witnesses. Expert witnesses are subject to different discovery rules, FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2), and their testimony must be screened under Rule 702. In addition, while expert witnesses'
testimony may be based on hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 703, lay witnesses must testify only to personal
knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 601.
165. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (allowing expert testimony where it will "assist the trier of fact").
166. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992).
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Supreme Court said that "[t]he distinction between an expert and a non-expert
witness is that a non-expert witness's testimony results from a process of
reasoning familiar in everyday life and an expert's testimony results from a
process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.'
170
The Advisory Committee noted that "[t]he amendment incorporates the
distinctions set forth in State v. Brown."
171
By referring to the "process of reasoning" involved in drawing the two types
of inferences, the Brown court, and by extension the Advisory Committee,
appear to be focusing on the difficulty of understanding the subject matter of the
testimony. The facts of Brown show this principle at work. In Brown, the
Tennessee Supreme Court faced the questions of whether a paramedic should
have been allowed to testify about the likely cause of bruising around a child-
abuse victim's eyes and of whether a nurse should have been allowed to testify
that an injury was caused by a cigarette burn. 72 The defendant argued that this
testimony was expert testimony and that neither witness was qualified to offer
it. 173 The court found that the nurse's testimony was not in the nature of expert
testimony and was a permissible lay opinion, but that the paramedic's testimony
was in the nature of expert testimony and should not have been admitted in the
absence of evidence demonstrating his qualifications.
174
Although the court did not offer much explanation, its result squares with
its test. Any person with even a little bit of relevant experience could recognize
with a fair degree of accuracy when a burn mark is from a cigarette. The
"process of reasoning" involved is very straightforward. On the other hand, the
causes of a distinctive type of facial bruising could be much more ambiguous.
Pinpointing the cause requires judgments about how the human body works that
cannot reliably be made based solely on a handful of observations. The "process
of reasoning" required to draw the inference requires resort to a body of
complex medical knowledge.
175
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 701 gives another example that
also demonstrates the distinction. The note cites United States v. Westbrook,
176
in which the court found no error where two heavy amphetamine users were
permitted to testify that a substance was an amphetamine, but did find error
where a witness without experience using amphetamines was allowed to make
such an identification.1 77 No difficult process of reasoning is required for a
170. Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 549.
171. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
172. Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 549.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 550. The court, however, held the error harmless because of existence of other
evidence as to cause of the injury. See id. at 550 (noting "ample evidence of skull trauma" with
Paranedie's testimony).
175. See, e.g., Hall v. State, No. A-7256, 2001 WL 1518763, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2001)
(Mannheimer, J., concurring) (applying Brown test to find that comparison gun muzzle and tear in car
seat was kind of comparison anyone could do, so not expert testimony).
176. 896 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1990).
177. Westbrook, 896 F.2d at 336.
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person who has experienced a sensation before to conclude that he experienced
the same sensation upon ingesting a particular substance. But in the absence of
that sort of brute sensory experience, the identification of the substance could be
very complex. White powders tend to look alike, so the only way to reliably
identify one is to determine its chemical composition. Doing so requires
performing tests and making inferential leaps that would not be obvious to the
average person.
In sum, the Advisory Committee's test seems to boil down to asking a
question something like this: Would a typical person-without extensive training
or expertise-be able to understand the subject matter of the testimony if that
person had experienced what the witness experienced? Most people can
understand how to recognize a person's handwriting, or the effects of a drug, or
even how much profit could be expected from a business, based on a handful of
experiences with those matters. Testimony about those subjects is thus lay
testimony. On the other hand, most people would need education, training, or
significantly more experience to understand the responses of the human body to
various physical invasions, or to understand how to identify the chemical
compositions of white powders. Testimony about those subjects is expert
testimony.
It should be obvious that the Advisory Committee's test does not magically
solve all problems of distinguishing lay from expert testimony. First, the test
probably sets too high a bar. While it may work to define a ceiling for lay
testimony, it does not work to define a floor for expert testimony. Expert
testimony is admitted all the time on topics like the valuation of businesses,
which the Advisory Committee puts into the lay testimony box. 78 Rules 701 and
702 purport to draw a clear line between lay and expert testimony, but if the
Advisory Committee's test is intended to accomplish that objective, it fails.
179
The test also fails if it is intended only to put a ceiling on permissible lay
testimony. In particular, it does not give adequate direction for classifying
witnesses who testify based solely on experience. With enough experience, most
of us could understand most things in the world. Some things learned through
experience-like the effects of various drugs-should be considered the subject
of lay testimony, while other things learned through experience-the workings of
automobiles as understood by an amateur mechanic, for instance-should
probably be considered the subject of expert testimony. The Advisory
178. See FED. R. EvrD. 701 advisory committee's note (stating that valuation of businesses is
subject of lay testimony).
179. It is not entirely clear that the test is intended for use in establishing the floor for expert
testimony. In an article explaining the amendment to Rule 701, Gregory Joseph, one of the members
of the Advisory Committee, emphasized Rule 701's limitation on lay testimony as follows:
The amendment to Rule 701 is intended to more clearly demarcate the line between
opinions that may be rendered by lay persons and those that may be rendered only by
experts. By doing so, the amendment is designed to prevent circumvention of the pretrial
disclosure rules relating to expert witnesses.
Gregory P. Joseph, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure & Evidence: A
Preliminary Analysis, SG103 A.L.I-A.B.A 361, 391-92 (2000) (emphasis added).
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Committee's test does not provide a foolproof way of distinguishing between
those classes.
Nevertheless, the test contains valuable insights that can also be put to use
in identifying the permissible scope of juror background knowledge. In
particular, the test echoes the standard, based on the old "beyond the ken" test
for expert testimony, that the New York Court of Appeals seemed to endorse in
Arnold. Both emphasize capacity to understand the subject matter in question.
Whether or not capacity to understand can play the role the Advisory
Committee has chosen with respect to Rule 701, it is an integral part of a useful
definition of juror expertise.
2. The Vicarious Knowledge Test
The Supreme Court in Daubert enunciated a basis for distinguishing
between expert and lay witnesses that rested on a distinction between knowledge
acquired through first-hand observation and knowledge acquired vicariously. 180
"Unlike an ordinary witness.., an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer
opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or
observation. '" 181 The Court then used that difference to justify its imposition of a
special reliability requirement on expert testimony. "[T]his relaxation of the
usual requirement of firsthand knowledge ... is premised on an assumption that
the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of
his discipline."'81 2 The expert's reliance on vicarious knowledge appears in two
ways. First, the expert is permitted to learn about the facts of the case by way of
hearsay, whereas the fact witnesses must have personal knowledge. 8 3 Second,
and less obviously, experts rely to a much greater degree than lay witnesses on
received learning-as opposed to first-hand experience-in forming the major
premises that allow them to draw inferences about the facts of the case. t84
Edward Imwinkelried has argued that the fact that experts rely on vicarious
knowledge of the latter form is the central reason for treating experts differently
from lay witnesses:
That reliance on the vicarious experience of others in the specialty field
is what distinguishes lay from expert opinion. At once, that reliance
makes the expert's opinion more impressive and increases the difficulty
of challenging the opinion. The jury is likely to find the opinion more
180. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
181. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
182. Id.
183. Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing"), with FED. R. EVID. 701 ("If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness").
184. See JOHN MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 29 (1947) (discussing
that having expert knowledge "demands reliance upon the learning of the past" and comes from
absorbing "hearsay-lectures by his teachers, statements in textbooks, reports of experiments and
experiences of others in the same field").
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impressive .... Moreover, it is harder for the opponent to discredit the
opinion.... The jury might reason that even if the credibility of the
expert on the stand is suspect, the stature of the other experts in the
field remains unchallenged.
1 85
The distinction between first-hand and vicarious knowledge is an important
piece of the juror expertise puzzle. There is good reason to be more concerned
when a juror recites vicarious knowledge than when a juror recounts personal
experience. We value juries precisely because they bring real-world experience
to bear on unknowable questions of moral culpability. Jurors could not
effectively serve that function if they were forced to scrutinize their lives and
cabin any and all experiences that might lie outside the bounds of the ordinary.
On the other hand, we put much less value on a decision-maker's "book-
learning." We have moved away from juror qualification rules favoring the
educated and have resisted calls for the abolition of juries in complex cases.
186
Furthermore, while it would be enormously disruptive to probe jurors'
personal experiences at trial, it is easy to present evidence and allow cross-
examination on many of the subjects that jurors have learned vicariously. In
particular, scientific and medical principles are routinely the subject of expert
testimony; no good reason exists to allow jurors to speculate about those matters
when more reliable information is so readily accessible.
Finally, jurors' vicarious knowledge is based on hearsay. We disfavor
hearsay with good reason-it is less reliable than the information we glean from
our own senses.1 7 To the extent possible, we should attempt to bring hearsay
that is the basis of relevant vicarious knowledge into the hard light of the
courtroom, where it can be probed and rebutted.
Despite its value, however, the test of vicarious knowledge cannot alone
supply the standard for permissible juror background information. First, many
of the "facts" that we all take for granted we know only by way of vicarious
knowledge. For example, I "know" that a bullet wound to the head will cause
serious injury or death. How do I know that? Certainly not because I have
experienced or personally witnessed a bullet wound to the head. I know it
because that is what I have been told by people or sources I consider
authoritative. This is vicarious knowledge. It strains credulity to suggest that a
juror should not be allowed to utter such a banal fact in the jury room.
On the other side of the coin, the vicarious knowledge test falls short
because some things known through personal knowledge seem clearly to
constitute "expertise" that should be introduced through the evidentiary process.
For example, imagine an arson prosecution in which a retired firefighter sits on
the jury. The defense expert presents a theory for how the fire started, but the
juror contradicts that theory by saying that in his experience he never saw a fire
185. Imwinkelried, supra note 139, at 203-204.
186. See Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 29, at 901-16 (describing history of jury selection
rules).
187. See MCCORMICK, supra note 30 § 245, at 724-31 (providing reasons for existence of hearsay
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started that way. The defendant in this case, convicted based on the juror's
statements, would justifiably want the right to cross-examine the "expert" juror
to determine his qualifications and the basis for his opinion, just as Daubert
would require for a testifying expert. But the vicarious knowledge test would
provide no protection in that case because the juror's statements are based
entirely on first-hand perception.
C. A Proposed Standard
The case law directly addressing juror background knowledge suggests
three approaches, each of which invokes standards taken from the law governing
the admissibility of expert testimony. Under the first approach, a juror may not
communicate with the other jurors any background knowledge beyond matters
known by virtually everyone in the community. This approach provides for only
a narrow range of juror background knowledge. The problem with this approach
is that it is so restrictive it compels overbearing intrusion into the jury process.
Indeed, it has been rejected even in Texas, where it arose.
Under the second approach, a juror may not communicate with the other
jurors any background knowledge that would be required to come in as expert
testimony under Rules 701 and 702 if offered at trial. This approach has a
superficial attractiveness in that it treats jurors and lay witnesses consistently, but
it too has problems. First, simply invoking the words "expert" and "specialized
knowledge" does not magically resolve the issue. More guidance is needed, and
the Washington courts to date have not provided that guidance. Even if more
guidance is found, however, the distinction between lay and expert witnesses
cannot be exactly the same as the distinction between jurors and expert
witnesses. Rule 701 purports to draw a bright line between lay and expert
testimony, whereas Rule 702 clearly provides for an overlap between the
knowledge offered by experts and the knowledge brought by jurors.
Under the third approach, a juror may not communicate with the other
jurors any background knowledge that would be beyond the capacity of the
typical juror to understand. This approach allows juror knowledge to overlap
with expert testimony, but draws a line beyond which juror knowledge cannot
go. It is the most satisfying because it respects the roles of experts and jurors.
The task of expert witnesses and the task of jurors cannot be separated by a hard
line. To allow informed decision-making, experts and jurors must be allowed to
work in tandem, with the jurors contributing substantial experiential knowledge
and the expert witnesses offering additional background knowledge to fill in
gaps. Problems arise only when the information contributed by a juror falls so
far out of the realm of common experience that it implicates the reliability
concerns enunciated by Daubert/Kumho and the amendments to Rule 702.
Focusing on whether information is beyond the capacity of the average juror to
understand ensures the minimum amount of judicial intervention while still
responding to those core concerns.
The focus on "capacity to understand" also comports with the Advisory
Committee's suggested approach for separating lay from expert testimony under
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Rule 701.188 Again, a brighter line ostensibly divides lay and expert testimony
than divides permissible subjects of expert testimony and permissible subjects of
juror background knowledge. Nevertheless, the tests enunciated to distinguish
between lay and expert testimony can help provide guidance in the area of juror
expertise. As the Advisory Committee suggests, the level of training, education,
or experience required to understand the subject matter in question is a critical
factor in determining whether knowledge constitutes "expertise." Where the
"process of reasoning" required to understand a particular subject could easily
be grasped by most people with routine experience on a limited number of
occasions, the subject probably does not fall outside the realm of permissible
juror experience. But where the typical person would not be able to understand
the subject matter absent more formal education or training, or extensive
personal experience, that subject probably implicates sufficient concerns to
warrant judicial scrutiny.
In close cases, another useful factor to consider is whether the information
in question comes from vicarious sources or from personal experience.
Knowledge gained vicariously-through instruction, book study, or discussion of
similar experiences with others-implicates more of the concerns surrounding
expertise than does knowledge gained by way of first-hand experience.
Accordingly, any effort to circumscribe background knowledge should
concentrate on knowledge acquired vicariously. Knowledge acquired primarily
or exclusively through personal experience may cross the line into the realm of
impermissible juror expertise, but only where it is extraordinarily complex.
Putting these elements together, a necessarily imprecise standard emerges
for defining the permissible scope of juror background knowledge. Any matter
that is truly common-knowledge -that is known by all or most people living in
the time and place of the trial -is a proper subject of juror background
knowledge. Beyond that, jurors have relatively wide latitude to bring personal
experiences to bear on the decision-making process, even if those experiences
are uncommon. 8 9 But reason for concern arises whenever a juror brings
knowledge of a subject that would be difficult for an average person, who only
has a limited number of routine experiences with the subject in controversy, to
understand. Concern is especially warranted where the juror's knowledge rests
primarily or exclusively on sources other than first-hand experience, such as on
formal instruction, book learning, or conversations with others.
Under this standard, typical examples of background knowledge that would
warrant judicial scrutiny include medical knowledge in a medical malpractice
case, 190 knowledge of physics or engineering in a products liability case, 191 and
188. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note (proposing standard for delineating lay
and expert testimony based on difficulty of understanding subject matter).
189. See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 405 (arguing that because juries must comprise cross-section
of community, they must be allowed to take into account beliefs held by less than all members of
community).
190. See Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1994) (permitting expert in malpractice
case to testify to causation based on thirty years of experience as board-certified cardiologist and
review of variety of published materials).
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knowledge of complex accounting in a financial fraud case. 192 Each of these
areas requires extensive education, training or experience, rather than cursory
observation on a few occasions. And each relies extensively on book learning;
most people would have difficulty understanding them based solely on
experience. In contrast, more commonplace knowledge, such as the effects of
drugs or alcohol, 193 common practices and language of gang members or
police,194 and routine business practices,195 would not cross the line into
prohibited expertise.
196
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: PREVENTIVE AND REMEDIAL MEASURES
Identifying a standard for juror expertise is the first step in circumscribing
juror background knowledge. But the standard has no utility without an
enforcement mechanism. Both preventive and remedial methods of
enforcement are available, and courts have considered both. In this section, I
will discuss the available measures and then suggest an approach incorporating
both preventive and remedial components.
A. Preventive Measures
Preventive measures are those that operate to preclude impermissible juror
background knowledge from reaching the jury. They come in two basic types:
the challenge, which keeps a juror off the panel entirely; or the jury instruction,
which allows the juror to sit on the panel but instructs her not to use or divulge
the impermissible knowledge she possesses. Challenges, which I discuss first, are
further subdivided into two categories: peremptory challenges, which are limited
in number and which a party uses at its discretion; and challenges for cause,
which are not limited in number and are controlled by the court. 1
97
191. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1205 (3d Cir. 1995)
(disallowing lay testimony on cause of fatal accident involving aerial lift).
192. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(upholding admission of accounting expert in securities fraud case).
193. See United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (allowing lay witness to
testify that heavy drug users could appear to function normally and that "upper" drugs could
counteract effects of "downer" drugs); United States v. Westbrook, 896 F.2d 330, 336 (8th Cir. 1990)
(allowing lay witnesses with experience using amphetamines to identify substance as amphetamine).
194. See United States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d 553, 558-59 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding admission of
testimony by government agent regarding meaning of intercepted code language).
195. See United States v. Kelley, 615 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (allowing
testimony by bank officers, based on experience, on effect that loan application may have on decision
to grant loan).
196. Note that courts have regularly found these to be appropriate topics for expert testimony.
See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding that police officer who
testified about meaning of language used in drug trafficking qualified as expert). Again, both the test
for when expert testimony is allowed, and the test for when testimony must be offered by an expert as
opposed to a lay witness, are different from the test for when a juror's knowledge constitutes
impermissible expertise.
197. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 543 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining




Many of the courts that have refused to redress claims that jurors relied on
improper background knowledge have emphasized the availability of the
peremptory challenge as a way to remove undesirable jurors. In the leading case
of Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,198 the Ninth Circuit expressed this
view, stating that "[t]he type of after-acquired information that potentially taints
a jury verdict should be carefully distinguished from the general knowledge,
opinions, feelings, and bias that every juror carries into the jury room. Voir dire
questioning is the proper method of uncovering prejudicial character traits of
potential jurors."'199 Other courts have taken a similar stance.20°
The choice of the peremptory challenge as the sole enforcement mechanism
may arise out of any of several underlying beliefs. First, a court might conclude
that juror background knowledge simply does not present a significant problem.
The Ninth Circuit in Hard implied as much in its statement that "[i]t is expected
that jurors will bring their life experiences to bear on the facts of a case."
'201
Alternatively, a court might see the potential risks of juror background
knowledge, but conclude that those risks do not outweigh competing values such
as deliberative secrecy and stability of verdicts. 2°2 Finally, a court might have
serious concerns about juror background knowledge but conclude that the
parties are best situated to mitigate those concerns through voir dire, and that
their failure to do so constitutes a waiver.20 3 For these courts, the problem exists,
but it is not a problem demanding judicial intervention.
Regardless of the underlying motivation, the decision to leave the
regulation of juror background knowledge to the parties amounts to a decision
not to regulate juror background knowledge. Because of the limits on the
parties' exercise of peremptory challenges, that decision can have serious
consequences. Recall People v. Arnold,20 4 in which the defendant in a sexual
assault case moved to strike for cause a juror who had researched battered
FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 24(b).
198. 870 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1989).
199. Hard, 870 F.2d at 1461-62.
200. See State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 135 (N.M. 2002) (requiring preemptory challenge before
party can remove juror due to life experience); accord Brooks v. Zahn, 826 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991) (establishing that voir dire is time when party should raise potential for jury bias posed by
juror's specialized knowledge).
201. Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462.
202. See, e.g., Brooks, 826 P.2d at 1178 (refusing to categorize specialized knowledge possessed
by juror and revealed during jury deliberations extrinsic because doing so "would cause endless
examinations into jurors' comments during deliberations to determine whether a particular juror drew
upon unusual or expert knowledge to reach a verdict").
203. See Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 796 P.2d 737, 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(recognizing risks of juror expertise but affirming denial of new trial where doctor juror related
medical experiences because doctor's medical background was disclosed on voir dire and parties did
not object).
204. 753 N.E.2d 846 (N.Y. 2001).
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woman's syndrome. 20 5 The trial judge denied the challenge. 20 6 The defendant
then used a peremptory challenge on the juror and subsequently ran out of
peremptory challenges.20 7 The New York Court of Appeals concluded that no
further inquiry into the potential juror's background knowledge was required
because her knowledge did not constitute expertise as defined by precedent in
People v. Maragh.20 8 The test I outlined in Part III(C) would probably produce
the same result, so that no remedy would be available in that case under my
approach, either. But in a case in which a potential juror's knowledge did
classify as expertise, a party who was forced to use a peremptory challenge to
strike that juror might then be handicapped in striking other jurors who present
biases not amounting to grounds for a challenge for cause.
20 9
Given recent developments in the law of evidence, the risks posed by juror
expertise are serious enough to warrant judicial intervention beyond the
peremptory challenge. The new standards for expert testimony have resulted in
the overturning of decades of laissez-faire approaches to the introduction of
expert testimony. These new standards are emblematic of an increased concern
about verdicts based on speculative "expertise." They indicate a move toward
greater judicial intervention to ensure the reliability of the major premises the
jurors use in forming inferences. The same concerns apply in this context to
compel a move away from laissez-faire approaches toward juror background
knowledge. Judicial intervention is required. That intervention can take the
form of challenges for cause, jury instructions, or post-verdict relief.
2. Challenges for Cause
A litigant attempting to exclude a juror for cause based on background
knowledge faces an uphill battle. Technically, challenges for cause come in two
varieties: the true challenge for cause, which arises when a juror fails to meet the
statutory qualifications for service, and the challenge for "favor," which arises
when a juror is interested in the litigation or has an actual bias toward one of the
205. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 850. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Arnold.
206. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 850.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 854. (citing cases including People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, (N.Y. 2000)). The court
did grant the defendant a new trial, on the grounds that the trial judge had not received an
unequivocal statement from the juror that she could be impartial. Id. at 851.
209. Of course, the systemic and societal value of peremptory challenges is a subject of heated
debate. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992) (arguing for abolition of peremptory challenges); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The
Language and Culture (not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993)
(criticizing conception of racial discrimination implicit in decisions limiting peremptory challenges);
Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996) (arguing that peremptory challenge has outlived its
usefulness); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992) (arguing that limits on peremptory challenges are essential
to protect rights of potential jurors). From the litigant's perspective, though, the loss of a peremptory
challenge is unequivocally bad.
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parties.210 A challenge based on background knowledge presumably must be
made under the latter theory, as no statutory reason for disqualification exists.
211
If that is in fact the case, the challenging party must then show that the juror's
knowledge necessarily resulted in the juror's bias against it.212 That can be a
very difficult showing to make.
In Arnold, the New York Court of Appeals required such a showing of bias
in addressing the defendant's claim that a juror with knowledge of battered
woman's syndrome should be stricken for cause.213 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the juror should have been automatically stricken.
214
Instead, the court asserted that "jurors must clearly express that any prior
experiences or opinions that reveal the potential for bias will not prevent them
from reaching an impartial verdict. '215 The court then concluded that as long as
"prospective jurors unambiguously state that, despite pre-existing opinions that
might indicate bias, they will decide the case impartially and based on the
evidence, the trial court has discretion to deny the challenge for cause .... 216
Needless to say, only a juror who truly wants to avoid service will fail this test.
Other courts that have faced direct requests to strike a juror for cause
because the juror possesses specialized knowledge have also rejected those
requests in the absence of a specific showing of bias.217 Without a significant
change in judicial attitudes, therefore, challenges for cause based on the mere
fact that a juror possesses relevant expertise-absent a showing of actual bias-
are unlikely to succeed. It is by no means clear, though, that courts should so
cursorily reject challenges for cause in this situation. Again, the Daubert
principle suggests that greater judicial intervention is warranted.
Daubert has been criticized for requiring people-judges-who have no
expertise in a field to determine whether purported expertise in that field is valid
and reliable. 218 The Daubert Court brushed aside that concern, declaring that it
was "confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake" the
210. See CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2483, at 119 (2d ed. 1995) (describing varieties of challenges for cause).
211. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 197, at 540 (explaining federal jury qualification rules).
Almost all jurisdictions have repealed provisions that either disqualified or exempted people from
serving on juries on the basis of their professions. The provisions that remain usually provide only a
discretionary exemption or an excuse for people who have important or sensitive jobs. Id.
212. Id.
213. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 850-52. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the reasoning in Arnold.
214. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 852,854.
215. Id. at 851.
216. Id. (concluding that trial court had not received sufficient assurances of impartiality and
therefore affirming Appellate Division's reversal of conviction).
217. For cases refusing to strike jurors for cause in absence of a showing of bias, see, e.g., Blank
v. Hubbuch, 633 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994), and State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 135 (N.M.
2002).
218. See Brewer, supra note 57, at 1550-53 (questioning ability of judges to evaluate scientific
evidence).
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required analysis.219 But there is real reason to doubt that judges will be able in
cases involving complex technical or scientific inquiries to educate themselves
sufficiently in the subject field to assess adequately the falsifiability, peer review,
error rate, and general acceptance of a given theory. 22° If that concern exists for
judges, who typically have a fairly high degree of education and a healthy
skepticism about claims of authority, it would seem to apply with even greater
force to lay jurors. Arguably, we should be moving toward a program of
systematically empanelling jurors with expertise in the fields likely to be at issue
in the litigation. At a minimum, it might seem counterintuitive to systematically
remove jurors with special knowledge about those fields from a panel.
But that seemingly counterintuitive result is precisely what the new
standards on expert testimony demand. As an initial matter, for better or worse,
we do and will continue to place our faith in judges to guard the adjudicative
system from spurious "expertise." That is the essential principle of the recent
developments in this area. For experts, the problem and the solution are both in
the open. The expert's testimony takes place in open court. The trial judge has
ample opportunity to review it, test it, and make determinations both about the
expert's qualifications and about the reliability of the testimony. The trial judge
can, in theory, ensure high standards of expert qualification and reliability.
The problem of juror expertise is less apparent. Because jurors are not
subject to discovery, voir dire of a juror is much less probing than voir dire of an
expert witness, so there is less chance for the parties to uncover a potential
problem. And because the jury's deliberations are secret, the effects of
speculative expertise are often unknowable. A jury may rely extensively on the
specialized knowledge of one of its members, but if no member of the jury is
willing to talk about the deliberations, this reliance will remain hidden
Conjoining Daubert's skepticism about expertise with the secrecy that
attends jury deliberations shows, paradoxically, that the problems of witness
expertise and juror expertise call for diametrically opposite solutions. For
witnesses, the court's job is to ensure expert qualification and reliability. It can
do that by screening the witness's testimony. But because juror expertise cannot
properly be screened through the Daubert process, the only way to guard against
spurious juror expertise is to ensure that jurors do not have expertise and so
cannot misuse it in the jury room. The only way the judge can perform the
requisite gatekeeper role is to strike the expert juror from the panel at the
outset.
Using the challenge for cause to regulate juror expertise has other positive
attributes. Most importantly, it avoids the high costs of overturning verdicts
post-trial where a juror with expertise improperly inserts it into the deliberating
process. Those costs include the actual cost of relitigating the case and the social
costs involved in destabilizing jury verdicts. The costs of the challenge for cause,
in contrast, are relatively low. A stricken juror is easily replaced, and because a
219. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.




juror's expertise will be relevant only in a certain type of case, the stricken juror
will not be unfairly deprived of the opportunity for jury service.
In addition, post-verdict remedies are inherently inequitable, because of the
difficulty of determining the role that a juror's background knowledge played in
deliberations. Because of differences in the willingness of individual jurors to
talk about their deliberations, one litigant might get redress for improper use of
juror background knowledge whereas another litigant suffering from the same
improper conduct may never learn about it. If the challenge for cause method is
employed, all litigants have the same opportunity to guard against the risks of
juror expertise.
3. Jury Instructions
One basic remedy for the problem of juror expertise is to instruct the jurors
not to discuss or rely on their background knowledge about specialized
matters.221 This is a simple and cost-effective way to offer at least some
protection from speculative juror expertise. But it cannot be the sole measure
taken, because, despite our systemic adherence to the fiction that jurors follow
instructions on how to use evidence, empirical studies have established that
jurors routinely rely on evidence they have been instructed not to consider.
222
Like a decision to rely solely on peremptory challenges, a decision to rely solely
on jury instructions amounts to a decision not to regulate juror background
knowledge at all. Still, jury instructions are an important part of the total
package of safeguards, because they can, in at least some cases, minimize the
damage from speculative juror background knowledge and thus reduce the
incidence of overturned jury verdicts. As I will explain in proposing remedial
measures, a party should not be allowed to seek to overturn a verdict unless it
first requested a jury instruction that might have prevented the misconduct.
B. Remedial Measures
In addition to attempting to prevent the jurors from relying on improper
background knowledge, a party may attempt to remedy the reliance on improper
background knowledge after the verdict is handed down. There are two
procedural mechanisms to attack the verdict: the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (now called simply the motion for judgment as a
matter of law in the Federal Rules of Civil procedure and the motion for
221. Some courts have used a much more ambiguous instruction as part of their pattern
instructions. See Marshall v. State, 44 So. 742, 743 (Fla. 1907) (upholding jury charge: "You will bring
to bear upon the consideration of the evidence in this case, in addition, all that common knowledge of
men and affairs, which you, as reasonable men have and exercise in the everyday affairs of life").
222. See Joel D. Lieberman, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other
Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 677, 677 (2000) (discussing that research shows
limiting instructions to have little effect and can even produce "backfire effect" whereby jurors may be
more prone to rely on inadmissible information after being instructed to against it).
[Vol. 75
THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPERT JUROR
judgment of acquittal in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), 223 and the
motion for new trial.
224
1. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"), as its
name suggests, allows a court to grant judgment for the party against whom the
verdict was rendered. It is available for any party in a civil case225 and for the
defendant in a criminal case.226  The judge must conclude "that there is
insufficient evidence to go to the jury or that the evidence is so compelling that
only one result could follow.
'2 27
In limited situations, courts may use the JNOV to enforce limitations on
jurors' reliance on speculative expertise. State v. Baldwin228 shows how that
might happen. In Baldwin, the defendant was charged with drunk driving under
a state statute making it per se illegal to drive with a blood alcohol content of
0.08 or greater.229 The only admissible evidence against the defendant was a
blood alcohol test taken two hours after the arrest showing a blood alcohol
content of exactly 0.08.23o The defendant was convicted and the trial judge
denied his motion for post-trial relief.231 The appellate court reversed the
conviction. 232 The court found that in the absence of evidence demonstrating the
correlation between a delayed blood alcohol test and the blood alcohol content
at the time of arrest, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.23 3
[A] BAC reading from a laboratory test is just a sterile number; by
itself it tells us nothing about a driver's condition hours earlier.
Extrapolating backward in time can be a difficult task even for experts.
For a lay jury, unassisted by corroborating evidence, the assignment
becomes mere camouflage for guesswork. 234
There was no suggestion in Baldwin that any juror possessed knowledge
about blood alcohol tests that he passed on to the other jurors. But the result
would presumably be the same if such a juror were present-the jurors would
still not be permitted to speculate about the medical facts of the case in the
absence of expert testimony.235 Thus, in a case like Baldwin, the JNOV could be
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).
224 FED. R. Civ. P. 59; FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
225. See FED. R. Cv. P. 50(b) (placing no limit upon the identification of the party).
226. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (allowing only the defendant in a criminal trial to file a motion
for judgment of acquittal).
227. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 197, at 560.
228. 30 P.3d 394 (N.M. 2001).
229. Baldwin, 30 P.3d at 396.
230. Id. at 396-97.
231. Id. at 394.
232. Id. at 396.
233. Id. at 397-400.
234. Baldwin, 30 P.3d at 398 (citations omitted).
235. Harris v. Pounds, 187 So. 891 (Miss. 1939). The critical issue in Harris was whether a log was
too heavy to be carried by six men. The evidence in the record provided the length and girth of the
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used to prohibit the jury from relying on impermissible specialized background
knowledge.
But the JNOV mechanism will only rarely be an effective remedy for
improper use of juror background knowledge. In the vast majority of cases in
which specialized knowledge is likely to play a role in the decision, both
parties-or at a minimum the party with the burden of proof-will offer expert
testimony. In any such case, there is likely to be sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict either way, so the judge will not have grounds for granting judgment
as a matter of law. Instead, the only available remedy will be a new trial.
2. Motion for New Trial
All courts have the authority to grant a new trial on grounds of jury
misconduct. 236 The decision to grant a new trial on grounds of jury misconduct
involves three steps. First, the court must conclude that the alleged misconduct is
of the type to warrant inquiry under the jurisdiction's rules governing
impeachment of verdicts.237 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and in
states following the Federal Rules, the court may consider juror testimony
impeaching the verdict only if the moving party shows that the evidence the jury
allegedly considered was "extraneous. '238 Next, if the court finds that the
information was "extraneous," the court must determine that it was
"prejudicial," apparently in the sense that it is not neutral or trivial.239 Once the
court concludes that Rule 606(b) is satisfied, so that it may consider juror
testimony about what took place, it must determine whether the alleged
misconduct sufficiently tainted the process to warrant a new trial.240 As a
practical matter, courts very often collapse this process, so that the finding that a
matter is worthy of further inquiry is frequently tantamount to a finding that a
new trial is warranted.
2 4'
For courts that have recognized the dangers of juror background
log, but not the weight. The jury found for the plaintiff, but on appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed and entered judgment for the defendant. The court found that because the weight of a log of
given size is not common knowledge, the jury could not infer the weight absent expert testimony. Id.
at 893.
236. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 197, at 581 (explaining rules regarding juror
misconduct).
237. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 197, at 587-88 (describing process for considering juror
impeachment of verdicts).
238. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
239. Id.; see State v. Gabourie, 154 Cal. Rptr. 635, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that prejudice
is only presumed to result from jury misconduct when irregularity influenced result).
240. See 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 905 (7th
ed. 1998) (noting that trial judge should "reason by inference" as to effect of extraneous information
and outside matters on jury deliberations when assessing whether new trial should be granted).
241. See Gov't of V.I. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating "[t]hose incidents of
jury misconduct which may be attested by the jurors and those which furnish a basis for setting aside a
verdict overlap extensively. Indeed, courts often seem to treat the two concepts interchangeably in
deciding whether a verdict may be successfully impeached").
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knowledge, the new trial has been the primary avenue of redress.242 These
courts have concluded that a juror's specialized background knowledge is
"extraneous information" and granted relief where it appears that the
introduction of that knowledge resulted in prejudice. 243 The problem with this
method of addressing juror background knowledge is the high cost it imposes.
The inquiry itself imposes costs in that it may chill the deliberative process by
making otherwise secret deliberations public.244 To the extent the inquiry results
in a new trial, it imposes even more concrete costs on the parties, who must now
endure the expense of a new trial or accept a settlement that neither wanted. In
addition, relying on post-verdict remedies is inherently inequitable because of
the differences in jurors' willingness to discuss their deliberations.
Despite these drawbacks, though, post-verdict review will almost certainly
continue to be a primary means of regulating juror background knowledge,
because of courts' reluctance to strike jurors based on the potential for prejudice.
Minimizing its negative impact requires sensitivity in responding to the many
ways in which specialized juror background knowledge can affect the decision-
making process. A number of courts have taken novel approaches intended to
target only certain uses of juror expertise. Two such approaches stand out.
First, some courts have drawn a distinction between the use of expert
background knowledge to assess the credibility of the evidence in the case and
the insertion of background knowledge as evidence. The court in Solberg v.
Robbins Lumber Co.2 4 5 enunciated this distinction. In Solberg, a personal injury
case stemming from an injury suffered on a lath machine, several jurors with
knowledge of lath machines asked whether they were permitted to rely on that
knowledge in "weighing th[e] evidence and convincing other jurors as to the
facts of the case." 246 The trial judge answered that question in the affirmative
and the appellate court agreed.247 The appellate court noted that:
It is well-settled that jurors cannot supply a material item of evidence
by assuming knowledge on the subject. It is just as well settled that it is
highly improper for a juror to assert in the jury room knowledge on
some specific point involved in the trial which would make him a
material witness.
248
But the court went on to say that:
A person is not supposed to forget everything he ever knew and
242. See, e.g., People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000) (granting new trial when juror
injected expertise into deliberations); State v. Briggs, 776 P.2d 1347 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (same);
Fritsch v. J.J. Newberry's, Inc., 720 P.2d 845 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
243. See Leavitt v. Swain, 963 P.2d 1202, 1209-10 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (finding that nurse's
knowledge may have constituted "extraneous information" and remanding for determination of
prejudice).
244. See supra note 17 for a discussion, and quotation from McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-
68 (1915), on deliberative secrecy.
245. 133 N.W. 28 (Wis. 1911).
246. Solberg, 133 N.W. at 29.
247. Id. at 29-30.
248. Id. at 30.
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become an automaton when he is sworn as a juror. He may make use
of intelligence with which he is endowed and the knowledge he has
gained for the legitimate purpose of passing upon the credibility of the
evidence.
249
The court further concluded that the knowledge used for that purpose was not
limited to matters of common knowledge.
250
Although Solberg, like many older opinions, is a bit cryptic, it seems to hit
on an important point. Where there is evidence on a fact in issue and a juror
imparts his expertise to help the other jurors decide whether to believe the
evidence, substantially fewer risks attach than where a juror uses his background
knowledge to draw inferences that fill in gaps where evidence is lacking. In the
former case, the jurors have before them a body of evidence that has been tested
through the adversary process. The jurors must make a decision as to whether
they should believe the evidence, and that decision is likely to be no worse given
the input from the expert juror than it would be if they made it based solely on
their own notions of credibility. In the latter case, in contrast, there may be
important reasons why testimony is lacking on a particular topic. Most notably,
expert testimony may be absent either because no expert could be found who
would take a desired position or because the judge excluded the testimony after
a Daubert analysis. In such a case, the speculations of a self-appointed expert
juror pose serious risks to procedural fairness, because they may lead the jury to
draw conclusions that have already been ruled out of the case.
A more recent decision, State v. Mann,251 reiterates this concern. In Mann,
the defendant was accused of stabbing his son with a screwdriver. 252 The
defendant contended that the child was impaled when he accidentally fell on the
screwdriver, and called an expert witness to attest to the possibility of such an
accident. 25 3 One of the jurors was an engineer who performed probability
calculations based on the expert's figures and argued that the expert had
overstated the probability of the injury occurring the way the defendant had
claimed. 254 The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that this did not
constitute extraneous prejudicial information.255 In reaching that decision, the
court emphasized that the juror's calculations were "based on testimony and
evidence properly introduced at trial. '256 The court noted that "'[a]lthough
potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside
of the record for the jury, the jury must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence
and to use its experience to deliberate.'
257
249. Id.
250. Id. at 31.
251. 39 P.3d 124 (N.M. 2002).
252. Mann, 39 P.3d at 125-26.
253. Id. at 126.
254. Id. at 127-28.
255. Id. at 133.
256. Id. at 134.
257. Mann, 39 P.3d at 134 (quoting New Mexico v. Chamberlain, 819 P.2d 673,682 (N.M. 1991)).
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Neither Solberg nor Mann enunciates a clear standard for delineating expert
input on credibility as opposed to expert input that adds new facts. But the
essential concern underlying the decisions can be addressed by exercising
heightened scrutiny of juror expertise where there is no expert testimony on the
subject in question. In such a case, the juror's speculations pose a much greater
risk than they do where there is expert testimony and the juror's comments can
be accepted or disregarded by the other jurors in deciding whom to believe.
Whether the fact that the juror's expertise does not relate to evidence already in
the case helps to show that it is "extraneous" or helps to show that it is
"prejudicial" is irrelevant.258 The important point is that the presence of expert
testimony on the subject reduces the impact of the juror's background
knowledge and so makes the case for a new trial less compelling.
Another distinction drawn is between a juror's use of his background
knowledge in formulating his own opinions about the case and the recitation of
the factual experiences that form the basis for the background knowledge. The
dissenting judge in Richards v. Overlake Hospital Medical Center25 9 drew this
distinction most explicitly. In Richards, the parents of a child with severe
neurological defects sued their obstetrician for malpractice.26°  The expert
testimony in the case conflicted on the cause of the defects. 261 One of the jurors,
who had some medical training, raised the possibility during deliberations that
the defects could have been caused by the mother's flu during pregnancy.
262
None of the expert witnesses had addressed this possibility.263 The majority held
that even if this constituted improper specialized knowledge, the parties had
waived any objection by not striking the juror after she disclosed her knowledge
in voir dire.
264
The dissent disagreed on the waiver theory, and also suggested that the
majority had not properly analyzed the background knowledge issue. 265 The
dissent focused on the distinction between offering an opinion based on
specialized background knowledge and relating the experiences that underlie
that knowledge:
266
The extrinsic evidence is not that [the juror] reviewed [the plaintiff's]
medical records and then stated that in her opinion, the flu, rather than
negligence of the doctors, explained the defects of the child. Rather,
the extrinsic evidence was that [the juror] cited examples from her own
258. Compare id. at 136 (finding that juror's specialized knowledge was not "extraneous
information" because testimony introduced on subject), with State v. MacKenzie, No. 46248-2-I, 2001
Wash. App. LEXIS 2493, at *9-10 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2001) (finding that juror's specialized
knowledge was not "prejudicial," even if extraneous, because testimony was introduced on subject).
259. 796 P.2d 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
260. Richards, 796 P.2d at 739.
261. Id. at 740.
262. Id. at 742.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 743.
265. Richards, 796 P.2d at 745-46 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 746.
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experience to buttress her position and influence the others.
267
Although less explicitly, the court in People v. Maragh6 8 seemed to draw a
similar distinction. The court noted that "it would be unrealistic to expect jurors
to shed their life experiences" in performing their duties as jurors.269 But the
court emphasized that "[t]hey may not, however, take the additional, forbidden
step beyond the evidence of the cases before them .... This substitution of
professional opinion is fatal when shared with the rest of the jury."270 The court
concluded that "it may be useful for trial courts to modify their standard
instructions differentiating between ordinary and professional opinions of jurors,
and directing that jurors may not use their professional expertise to insert facts
and evidence outside the record with respect to material issues into the
deliberation process."
271
Both of these opinions seem to focus on the distinction, which I set out
more fully in Section II.A of this article, between the drawing of an inference
from a major premise incorporating specialized knowledge and the disclosure of
the major premise itself. The dissenting judge in Richards and the court in
Maragh see no problem where a juror possessing some degree of expertise relies
on that expertise in forming her own judgments about the case and then votes
accordingly. That is, they see no problem where a juror performs an inference or
series of inferences and reports her conclusion. But they become concerned
when the juror reports the experiential sources for her inductively derived major
premises. At that point, in these judges' view, the juror has crossed a line into
providing non-record evidence that should properly be introduced through
formal trial procedures.
This approach has a theoretical attractiveness, because it hones in on the
real concern underlying the problem of juror expertise. Again, the point of
Daubert and its progeny is to ensure that only reliable knowledge goes into the
major premises that the jurors use to make their decisions. If a single juror uses
speculative background knowledge to make a decision, that poses significantly
fewer risks than if the entire jury hears the speculative knowledge and
incorporates it into their collective decision-making process. Barring jurors only
from reporting the experiences that underlie their major premises, thus, at least
on the surface, best effectuates Daubert's primary objective.
As a practical matter, however, attempting to draw this distinction poses
insurmountable problems. First, jurors are unlikely to be able to understand,
much less comply with, an instruction to this effect. It will be impossible for
them to figure out with any consistency which of their experiences are common
enough to be appropriate for discussion and which they must keep secret and
rely on only in reaching a final decision. Furthermore, even if the "expert" juror
correctly parses his experiences, once the other jurors know the source of his
267. Id. at 745.
268. 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000).
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expertise they will likely rely on his opinion to the same degree as if he had
spelled out its experiential bases. And finally, post-verdict efforts to ensure that
jurors honored the distinction will even more drastically embroil judges in the
deliberative process than would a straight inquiry into the use of expert
background knowledge for any purpose.
C. A Suggested Approach
The jury is too fundamental a part of our adjudicative system-particularly
our criminal system-for courts to undertake heavy-handed measures to weed
out jurors with certain types of background knowledge. This is an area that
needs regulation, but it needs regulation with a light touch and with appropriate
deference to the sometimes mysterious workings of the jury. Accordingly, what
I propose is not a set of firm rules, but a set of multifaceted guidelines for courts
to use at various stages of the process to control the risks of unchecked juror
expertise.
Because it imposes the least cost, one of the best places to begin regulating
juror expertise is before the jury is empanelled. Certainly the parties have the
ability, through the exercise of peremptory challenges, to exclude jurors
possessing potentially speculative specialized knowledge. But judges can and
should also play a role at this stage by granting challenges for cause in cases
where a juror's expertise clearly encroaches upon material issues in the case.
This is in some ways a novel use of the challenge for cause, which has
traditionally been used only where a juror falls astray of statutory qualification
requirements or demonstrates actual bias. For that reason, it should be used
only in cases where the juror's knowledge overlaps with the key issues in the
case, and so poses the greatest risk of prejudice. Also for that reason, judges will
likely resist it. But with the increased judicial intervention required by Daubert
and its progeny for expert witnesses, increased judicial intervention with respect
to expert jurors is now appropriate.
Once the jury has been empanelled, an additional level of prophylactic
regulation-the jury instruction-should be employed. Jury instructions are
virtually costless, and while they may often prove ineffective, they will in at least
some cases minimize or eliminate the effects of juror speculation about matters
of expertise. For these reasons, a request for a jury instruction should be a pre-
requisite to any request for post-verdict relief. A party who knows of a juror's
specialized background knowledge and fails to seek a jury instruction limiting
the use of that knowledge should not be heard to complain after the verdict if the
juror employed that knowledge in deliberations.
Finally, post-verdict relief should be granted only rarely. In cases where
evidence is missing on a critical element or the evidence is overwhelming on one
side, the court can grant JNOV to correct juror speculation resulting in a verdict
unsupported by the evidence. In closer cases, where the remedy is a new trial,
the court should grant relief only where it is clear that the injection of specialized
background knowledge did or could have compromised important procedural
values. In this analysis, two factors stand out.
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First, courts should be much more aggressive in criminal than in civil cases.
Criminal defendants have a right to confrontation that civil litigants do not.
272
The introduction of non-record evidence in a criminal case poses constitutional
problems that should not be ignored. In such a case, where it is determined that
a juror discussed his expertise-defined narrowly as only those matters beyond
the ability of the typical juror to comprehend-during deliberations, a
presumption of prejudice should arise. The prosecution should then bear the
burden of showing that no prejudice could result from the information.
273
Second, the risks of juror expertise are greater when a juror speculates
about a matter on which no expert testimony has been offered. In such a case,
the other jurors have no Daubert-screened evidence against which to assess the
non-record expertise offered by their peer. In contrast, where expert testimony
has been offered, the jurors at least have the benefit of a full presentation of
evidence, including cross-examination, on the matter in question. Accordingly,
they will be better able to assess the information supplied by the "expert" juror.
V. CONCLUSION
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. fundamentally changed the
way the legal system views expertise in the courtroom. But by focusing on only
the role of expert witnesses, courts and commentators have so far failed to grasp
the full implications of the Daubert revolution. Speculative "expertise"
introduced by a juror can pose problems just as real as "junk science" introduced
by a hired-gun expert witness. In the new climate of expert skepticism, courts
need to begin thinking more carefully about the information that jurors bring to
their deliberations.
On the other hand, jurors have a cherished place in our adjudicative system,
in contrast to the grudging acceptance traditionally afforded expert witnesses.
Important adjudicative values would be compromised were judges to ruthlessly
scrutinize jurors and their deliberations for hints of expertise. Daubert's
objectives, therefore, must be carefully balanced against the sometimes
competing concerns of the jury system.
In recognition of this need for balance, I have suggested a multifaceted
272. Of course, the prosecution does not have the right to seek a new trial where a defendant has
been acquitted.
273. See CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 554, at
248-49 (2d ed. 1982) (noting verdict must be reversed if extraneous matter introduced during jury
deliberations by court officer or juror and reasonable possibility of prejudice exists). In cases
involving unauthorized juror contacts, most courts have granted a new trial based on a showing of any
possibility of prejudice, and some have more explicitly couched this rule in terms of presumptions. See
United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1484-85 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing "rebuttable presumption of
prejudice arising from jury exposure to external information) (quoting Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp.
Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 922 (10th Cir. 1992)). The rule I suggest tracks those decisions. It is worth noting,
however, that some courts have seemed more willing to put the burden of showing prejudice on the
defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating prejudice is not
to be presumed and defendant bears burden of proof to show unauthorized communications with
jurors resulted in juror partiality).
[Vol. 75
THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPERT JUROR
approach to the problem of the expert juror. First, juror background knowledge
should be free of judicial scrutiny unless it cuts close to the core of Daubert's
concerns. There is no mechanical way to identify that point. Instead, courts
addressing a claim that a juror's knowledge strays too far from common
knowledge should focus on two factors. The primary factor is ease of
understanding the subject matter in question. Only where the subject is beyond
the capacity of most people to understand in the absence of extensive education,
training, or experience does it implicate sufficient concerns to warrant
regulation. The second, corollary factor is the extent to which the subject matter
incorporates vicarious knowledge-knowledge from books and other second-
hand sources-as opposed to knowledge gained through first-hand experience.
Courts should be less willing to interfere when a juror brings her own personal
experiences to bear than when she repeats knowledge acquired vicariously.
Once it is determined that a juror has knowledge that implicates the
Daubert concerns, courts may take several preventive measures. In cases where
the juror's knowledge overlaps with central issues in the case, courts should be
willing to strike the juror for cause. In the absence of a strike for cause, courts
should always give requested jury instructions designed to limit the extent to
which jurors repeat or rely on suspect expertise in their deliberations.
Where the reliance on impermissible juror expertise comes to light after
verdict, the court can either grant a JNOV or grant a new trial. New trials
should be granted only in limited circumstances. The failure to request a limiting
instruction should act as a waiver of a right to a new trial on this ground. If a
limiting instruction is requested and denied or given and ignored, a new trial
should be granted only rarely. Key considerations in the decision to grant a new
trial include whether the case is criminal or civil and whether expert testimony
was introduced on the subject matter in question. New trials should be granted
more readily in criminal cases and in cases in which a juror's expertise is used to
fill a gap where no expert testimony was offered. In any case, a new trial should
be granted only where it appears that the injection of impermissible background
knowledge actually affected the jury's deliberating process on a material issue in
the case.
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